[246 cont.]

x 648 [721] This same year 200 tents of Turkmen, who had been living with the Kalmuks for a long time, fled beyond the Yaik /Ural River/, and after the Kazaks had allowed to enter their territories they enslaved the fugitives and divided them among themselves.

[167 439 579] During the first years of the reign of Catherine, Russia's relations with the Kazaks were directed more than ever toward the two ends which she had in view: the first, to establish settlements in the two hordes; the second, to insure the inviolability of the caravans.

[361] For the first point, it was wished to revive the plan to build a strong city at the mouth of the Emba and to build a house there for Khan Nurali. But since his subjects feared to see the Russians in the middle of their steppes it was ordered to build a camp in the form of a redoubt instead of a fortress, to shelter the fishermen who came into this region. And in order to keep this establishment from even scaring the nomads, it was ordered that a market be opened where they could provide themselves with wheat from the crown at the lowest price. It was also wished to teach [177] them to [247] mow hay and to build sheds for their animals and dwellings for themselves if they asked for it. Likewise orders were repeated to the border authorities to build sheds for the animals and houses for those Kazaks who wished it on the Irtysh River and beyond the Ural. Taking advantage of the consent of a small number of Kazaks, the Siberian authorities, who had the advantage of living in good relations with certain Kazaks, were ordered to build an entire village on the small Kolchakly River and to obtain for it every imaginable advantage. In a word, the government tried every possible means to imbue its nomadic subjects with a taste for sedentary life. But they always had, and still have today, an invincible aversion to it, either as a result of their [181] nomadic life or for fear of losing their savage liberty, which they value above every kind of possession.

[439 579] For the second goal, the security of trade, it was necessary to seek new means, for 30 years of experience had proven that neither the khans nor the sultans could offer the caravans a sure and inviolable protection over the entire extent of their territories.

[247 cont.]

x648 The weakness of their power and their frequent dissensions are still
[439 almost unsurmountable obstacles to the security of trade, and
579] even to this day they make it impossible to make the caravan routes used by the merchants of Tashkent, Kokand, or their eastern neighbors perfectly safe. As for communications with the Bukharans and the Khivans, Russia has another route, that of the Caspian Sea. Before the hordes acknowledged themselves vassals of the empire, it was the only route which served Russia for its trade with Persia and Central Asia. Catherine was not slow to turn her attention to this matter, and having rejected useless hopes from the promises of the Kazak princes, which were both empty and pompous, she wished [248] to concentrate all the commercial relations of her subjects with Khiva and the dominion of Bukhara in Astrakhan. But this plan was not carried out, on the one hand because the Asiatics did not find it advantageous for them, and
[316] on the other hand because it threatened Orenburg, Troitsk, and all the copper and iron mines established in their environs with complete ruin.

[439] Nevertheless the intentions of the Russian government with regard to trade with Central Asia did not prevent it from supporting the exchange of goods with the Kazaks in every way possible.
[712] At first this was only done at Orenburg, while later it was begun at Troitsk and, in 1764, at the fort of Semipalatinsk. This last fort was designated for this purpose on the entreaty of Sultan Abulfenz, son of the famous khan, Abul Mahmet, and brother of Polat, khan of Turkestan. In the Middle Horde he was in command of the powerful Naiman descent group. He was independent, but camped in the former lands of the Dzungars, which had made him seek the protection of the emperor of China.
[439] Having never sworn loyalty to Russia nor had relations with her, he was able, without deception, to send a respectable elder to the authorities of the Siberian border to plead that his subjects have the liberty of trading with the Russians in Semipalatinsk. And this was immediately granted to him.

[342
● 177] At this time Sultan Ablai requested the Russian government to send him ten tillers of the soil to teach his Kazaks agriculture.
[661] Catherine gave orders to satisfy his request, after having taken

[266 cont.]

x 648 orders to the authorities to keep [267] constant and vigorous watch upon the maintenance of justice, desiring that they grant the Kazaks every possible protection and help (1). Fourth, large [346] sums of money were given to build mosques on the borders of Orenburg and Siberia, to which schools and caravansaries were to be attached.

● [177] By assembling all these establishments at the principal points of the border, the Empress intended not only to bring the Kazaks closer to the Russians but also to moderate their ways.

Exertions and expenditures were all in vain, for the Kazaks showed not the slightest desire to be civilized. In the [721] following year (1783) they did so much damage with their raids that it was impossible not to use armed force to punish them. Consequently, in the month of February, 1784, a detachment of 3,462 men was sent beyond the Ural River, and when they were unable to find the guilty persons, they seized 43 Kazaks who had [727] not taken any part in the last raids, in order to force them to x648 give up the prisoners. Their kinsmen were exasperated by this 721 injustice and immediately crossed to the right bank of the Ural 726 to avenge themselves. Independently of this attack, the residents along the border were laid waste at other points by Kazaks who were not pillaging for vengeance but for the love of pillage (2). A certain Syrym Batyr stood out among them, and we will soon point him out as a man chosen to be the instrument of the most important revolutions among the Kazaks. Meanwhile

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1. This wish of Empress Catherine was written in her hand, December 27, 1782 on the report from the commander of Orenburg, Lieutenant General Apukhtin.

2. In 1784 the Kazaks captured 176 Russians, and 175 in 1786. Who knows how many more they killed?

X 648 692 [269 cont.]
Catherine thought when she signed the ukase on May 2, 1784 for the formation of a border tribunal. Under the chairmanship of the supreme commander of Orenburg, it was composed of two clerks, two merchants, and two peasants who were Russians, a Kazak sultan and six Kazak elders, a deputy from the Bashkirs, and one from the Meshcheriaks. Its duty consisted of examining litigation and criminal cases which might take place between the Kazaks and the border residents.

X 648 [346] At the same time as this establishment, from which great advantages were expected, it was ordered to open mosques and schools for the Kazak children (1). The mosques were finished at Orenburg and Troitsk in 1785, and when this news was received, Catherine gave orders (2) to build schools and caravansaries or markets on the same sites without delay.

The persistent concern which this sovereign took in the state of the Kazaks was guided by her close attention to matters concerning them and a perfect knowledge of the real situation of her half-savage subjects. [177 721] Their constant banditry did not divert her from the intention of giving them a taste of good organization. On the one hand, she justly forgave them for many signs of insolence, as men who had no idea of the advantages of public order. On the other hand, her clever mind was not slow to discover that the Kazak raids were often no more than just reprisals for the wrongs and violences they had undergone from the Russians on the border, without speaking of the Bashkirs, who often crossed the Ural in defiance of all the prohibitions against it and laid waste their enemies.

X 648 721 [270] Actually, many of the raids were the fruit of vengeance. But the daring undertakings of a powerful band of brigands, which gathered in 1784 near the borders, were not among those which

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1. May 2, 1784.

2. September 4, 1785.

[271 cont.]

x648 All this was true, but no one paid any attention to it because
[721 no one in Orenburg believed in Nurali's sincerity, and the
[662] new government, being prejudiced against him, believed the
727] re-establishment of peace in the horde to be impossible without
changing its administration, or at least without a new khan.

x648 Baron Igelstrom's first choice for a new khan was Kaip, son
662 of Sultan Batyr, who had reigned in Khiva and was driven out
for his rapaciousness and cruelty. We have spoken of him several times, as well as of his father. The central government could not ignore the acts of hostility committed by this sultan against the Russians, nor his conduct in Khiva, and therefore his election was put off until more detailed information could be collected concerning him (1). And in the end it did not take place (2).

1. Rescript from the Empress to Baron Igelstrom of November 25, 1785.

2. A similar rescript of November 12, 1786.

Kaip was proposed for this position twice. The first proposal was brought about by two plans drawn up by Baron Igelstrom, who had firmly decided to introduce a new form of government in the Little Horde.

x648 In one of these plans he proposed to divide the horde into
[621 three sections, according to the number of its descent lines,
177] namely those of Semirod, Baiulin, and Alimul, and to give each
643 a khan, but to limit the authority of these new chiefs so that they
would bear only an honorary title and be, in effect, only the executors of the commands of the supreme head of the government of Orenburg.

[272] The other plan was to abolish the position of khan in
the Little Horde çompletely and gradually to apply to them the
[671] code given by Catherine for the administration of guberniyas.

This last thought was drawn from one of the cherished as well as most remarkable works of the Empress, and thus it was especially commended and confirmed in St. Petersburg.

[272 cont.]

x648 No one stopped to reflect on the possibility or impossibility
of carrying out this measure, because the Orenburg administration
had proposed it itself and must have the means of accomplishing it.

[177] Having received the approbation of the court, Baron Igelstrom
at once began to introduce the new order of things.

His first step produced results which were in perfect harmony
x648 with the end to which he aspired.

646 Without the intermediary of the Khan, he sent solemn procla-
728 mations throughout the entire horde, in which, without speaking
668 of the Khan nor of the sultans, he invited the elders and the peo-
177 ple to form an assembly in order to come to an agreement on the
means of maintaining order in the horde and living in obedience
to the Russian government. He advised them to renounce brigandage
and raids and to expect the pardon they deserved for their
repentance or severe punishments for the crimes which had been
disturbing public order. These proclamations almost completely
destroyed the last vestiges of the weak power of the Khan. Many
Kazaks who were followers of the Khan abandoned him and
joined his enemies, and all together they formed a national
assembly which did not contain one sultan, and where Batyr Syrym,
of whom we have spoken, twice presided as chief.

x648 The confidence shown by the people in Syrym in this instance
646 is very common, and is in perfect harmony with the Kazak notions
728 of the greatness of spirit. But who would fail to be surprised at
the consideration given in Orenburg to this [273] man who the
year before had been the leader of a band of brigands, at whose
head he had attacked Russian troops and forts?

All Syrym's actions showed that he was a man of vast intelligence but one unsatisfied, restless, and vindictive, and moreover, of an enterprising character rarely found among a half-savage people. After having distinguished himself among the bandits, he soon came to eminence in the council which had assembled to re-establish the general peace, as he believed that new and brilliant advantages lay in this for him. As he was an irreconcilable enemy of the Khan, not so much because of specific disputes with Nurali as of the longing he felt for the heriditary

x648 [277] elevated Kaip, a man of whom we have already spoken, to
668 this position several times. A third part of the horde did not wish to
643 recognize Kaip; but it asserted, as his subjects, that the Kazaks should have a khan, that their ancestors had found it necessary, and that they did not wish to set aside a custom which was hallowed by time. For this reason, they demanded either the return of Nurali or another khan in his place. During all this time, Syrym was Erali's prisoner.

x648 The situation weakened the conviction of the Orenburg head,
● 177 and Baron Igelstrom, being afraid of allowing the Kazaks to indulge
643 themselves in new disputes, requested the confirmation of Kaip as khan of the entire Little Horde. The Empress was of an entirely different opinion. Having once decided to introduce a form of government in the steppes beyond the Ural River which was in harmony with that of the interior provinces, she did not wish to change her plan unless absolutely necessary, and she replied, with her usual firmness, with an explicit refusal to Baron Igelstrom on November 12, 1786.

x648 Without entering into the good or the evil which could be produced by the authority of a khan among the Kazaks, we will only say that after all the proclamations made to the Little Horde in 1785 and 1786, Nurali's exile in Russia, and many other measures taken in order to introduce a new form of government among the Kazaks, Catherine could not give up a plan which had scarcely been tried without injury to her dignity. Consequently her reply was much more in accord with the dignity of the empire than was the proposal of the governor of Orenburg.

Besides, even if the Empress had consented to the restoration of the position of khan, she would not have preferred Kaip to
the other sultans who had far more rights than he. Several circumstances were opposed to the accomplishment of his ambitious ideas.
[579] First, a report was even made to Orenburg of the fact that while
he was living on the Syr [Darya] after his expulsion from Khiva,
[177 [278] he had often pillaged caravans and had expressed an open
643] hatred for Russia (1). Second, there was another obstacle in the

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1. See Baron Igelstrom's reports of September 23 and October 15, 1786.

[278 cont.]

x648 promise given to Abulkhair by Empress Anna to choose khans
● 177 only from among his successors. Third, Nurali had on his side
643 not only his kinsmen but also the most powerful princes of the Middle Horde, the most important of whom was Sultan Khudai Mendi, a man as distinguished for his intelligence as for the large number of his followers and the authority he had acquired over them.

x648 Vali Khan took a great interest in Nurali's fate and argued
664 vigorously with the Russian government (2) on his behalf, and he also wrote the same thing and warmly defended the descendants of Abulkhair, whom he called the father of all the Kazak khans subject to Russia and the first creator of the submission of the Little Horde (3). Finally, in 1787 a large part of the national assembly expressed the desire to see Nurali returned to the horde, out of respect for Abulkhair, who was considered a saint by many Kazaks. All these circumstances spoke in Nurali's favor, but they did not promise peace among the Kazaks in the future. Therefore, the execution of the latest intentions of the Russian government, to introduce in the Little Horde an organization conforming to that of the interior guberniyas continued unabated.

x648 Meanwhile Batyr Syrym regained his freedom and once again
662 began to influence the people in accord with the plans of the
177 Orenburg authorities, which he seconded as long as they were not contrary to his own views. Under the guise of devotion to Russia and gratitude to the local authority which had chosen him as its instrument, Syrym helped Baron Igelstrom greatly in the reforms which he made in the Little Horde in 1787, which we are about to describe.

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2. See Baron Igelstrom's report of December 18, 1786.

3. See another of Baron Igelstrom's reports, that of September 29, 1787.

[279]

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648 The most important was the establishment of tribunals,
692 which were called rasprava. Two of these were opened in the
● 177 Alimul and Baiulin descent lines, because of their large numbers.
693 The Semirod line only had one. Each rasprava was composed of
a president and two members, who were required to meet every day and to examine, with all three present, the petitions addressed to them and to give their decisions, to give satisfaction to the injured and the oppressed, and to give the dissatisfied the right to appeal to the border tribunal sitting in Orenburg. But since the members of these tribunals did not know how to read, all the writing was confided to a mullah, or secretary, who was assigned to each tribunal with an aide. His duty was to stamp the papers which were entered, copy them in a notebook, make the notes and protocols, make the examinations, keep the registers, establish and inscribe the hours of hearings, and write the reports, communications, and orders. All this was to be done according to the forms given by the government of Orenburg.

In addition a principal elder was chosen in each of the three descent lines of the Little Horde and several secondary elders to supervise the conduct of the people.

Batyr Syrym, who belonged to the Baiulin descent line, was chosen as one of the three principal elders.

All those who were elected to fill the positions we have named for the first three years were called upon to swear an oath to serve faithfully. Later they were confirmed (1) by the Empress, and they were given large stipends, partly in wheat and partly in money.

1. The preliminary decision of the Empress to open the tribunals was presented to Baron Igelstrom by a rescript of June 3, 1786, and the confirmation of the elders nominated for the places on December 7, 1787.

[279 cont.]

x648 After this beginning Baron Igelstrom, who felt, on the
basis of Syrym's assurances, that the establishment of peace in
the Little Horde was inevitable, [280] prepared to build cities,
mosques, caravansaries, and schools in the middle of the steppes.
● [177] He reported this to the Empress and planned to comply in every-
thing with the organization of the provinces of the interior and
to the regulations published in Russia on public education.

[181] This gratifying and consoling hope did not last long. By
the following year, 1788, it was beginning to weaken, and soon
it disappeared completely. The people, who had long been
[662 accustomed to excitement and brigandage, tired of their inactivity
578] and once more began their old disputes, driven from
643 one side by Nurali's kinsmen, from another by Kaip, and from
a third by Batyr Syrym. The followers of the latter were the
most numerous and the most active. The sultans could have no
power over them, as they were no longer respected. The elders
[692] chosen to supervise the conduct of the people, as well as the
heads of the tribunals, had no authority and dared not give
commands, and followed the stream which carried them along.

[721 These internal circumstances were joined by others which
662] acted from outside. The Turks, then at war with Russia, sought
to incite the Bukharans against the Russians. The Bukharans
aroused the Little Horde, and it was to this end that they suggested
to Erali, at first, that they help him take back Khan Nurali by
force. Later they entered into relations with Syrym and sent him
x648 and those of his line an appeal couched in these terms:

721 "To the brave warriors, beys, and elders, Sarytai bey,
771 Syrym Batyr, Shukurali bey, Sadyrbek, Barak Batyr, Dajdan
186 Batyr, peace and blessing. And now our words. Glory to the
662 most high God! By His holy grace, all our affairs are running
smoothly. We have but one sorrow. Not long ago an ambassador
came to us from the Turkish sovereign, vicar of God, with a
letter informing us that the infidel Russians have assembled from
all sides and, in alliance with the seven Christian states, have
started to march. [281] Since you live closer to the Russians than
we do and, consequently, know better how to fight them, we propose

[313 cont.]

Chapter V. On the Possibility of Making the Kirghiz-Kazaks Adopt Sedentary Customs.

631 The division of territory, of which we spoke in relation to the
636 camps of each tribe, might cause one to believe it possible to
311 establish each tribe or each descent line on the land it occupies,
177 in fixed positions, since it recalls to a certain point, the idea of territorial property. But this idea vanishes when one comes to consider the nature of the country and the moral inclinations of its inhabitants.

233 The care of the herds and their propagation is, as has been said before, the favorite and cherished occupation of the Kazaks, as well as the source of all their wealth. In order to sustain this
311 branch of economy in the flourishing state in which it is at
181 present, vast pasture lands are indispensable, and considering
579 the inclination of nomadic peoples for brigandage, these pastures cannot have fixed limits, and in addition, they are divided into two classes, summer and winter pastures. An open plain, smooth and rich [314] in fodder, is excellent for the livestock in summer, but during the winter confining hills are necessary, especially for the ewes, to protect them from the winds and storms, and also sand which absorbs moisture and on which, therefore, the snow
222 remains for a shorter time, as well as reeds and heather, which
372 provide good nourishment for the camels and good fuel for the shepherds.

311 This is why every tribe has its winter and summer pastures,
233 the former usually in the south. Thus the Baganaly and the Naimans, who spend the summer on the Ishim or the Turgai rivers, withdraw in winter to the Kuvan-Darya, while the Djappas people leave the market of Troitsk in November to go toward the shores of the Syr [Darya]. The same could be said for many others.
361 It is clear from this that the Kazaks must either have two different
439 camps according to the seasons or reduce the number of their animals. In this last case they would do harm not only to themselves but also to their neighbors, whose trade relations with them have the sole purpose of exchanging livestock.

[315 cont.]

181
152 often as its own expense, and has used
[636 every means of persuasion to induce
342] certain individuals among them to settle
down, at least to provide an example.
But all these efforts have been futile.

[579 their tents to live in houses. Next let us examine the ethical rela-
627] tions of the tribes and descent lines. Vengeance carried out by
[628 one individual against another, the participation of their families
578] in it, their auls, their /clan/ divisions, and sometimes their tribes,
and the perpetual reprisals which result from this, sometimes re-
[166] quire hundreds of families to move away from their dwelling
places and to withdraw much farther away, forever, in order to
evade the persecutions of their enemies.

721 It is thus that the entire Karakalpak nation, which had lived independently under the orders of its own khans on the [316] shores of the Syr [Darya], lost its existence as a state in the last years of the 18th century and was forced to disperse as a consequence of the frequent attacks of the Kazaks and the acts of vengeance that they carried out to wipe away old injuries.

101 In 1740 a large part of the Middle Horde, with its khan,
Abul Mahmet, occupied the eastern shores of the Khobda River.
Abulkhair lived most often on the shores of the Syr [Darya] or the
Kuvan. This is why he wrote to Nepluev in Orenburg in 1742:
166 "I am with the Little Horde on the Syr [Darya], and the Middle
Horde is near you, General." Today it is the opposite. None of
the tribes of the Middle Horde are near Orenburg. Several of the
auls of the Alimuly descent line in 1821 even came to make their
winter camps on the banks of the Ilek, although they had always
578 had them on the Syr [Darya], as a result of internal dissensions,
during which their enemies were supported by the khan of Khiva.
At the same time several auls which habitually camped near the
361 Russian border withdrew toward the land of Khiva. All this leads
181 us to the conclusion that the present way of life of the Kazaks and
636 the nature of the land they inhabit do not permit them to form
● 177 permanent establishments, and that for their own advantage as

5: Levchine--181 G-4,5 (ca.1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

[316 cont.]

361 well as that of the neighboring states, and especially of Russia,
181 it is to be desired that they not change their condition of being
636 rich herders for that of poor farmers, since their steppes seem,
177 as it were, to be made for nomadic peoples. Good order and peace
will not be made to reign in their tribes by establishing villages.
There will be no success in making them appreciate the fortunate
results of peace except in training them in obedience and especially
in observing rules of strict equity with regard to them.

7: Sedel'nikov et al. --32 U-4.5 (no date) 1903

RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Historical Turkestan RL2

H.T /156 cont./ In the course of time
167 175 and with the increase in population, misunderstandings arose
648 between the Kirghiz /Kazak/ landlords and the immigrant
241 renters (who sometimes went too far in exploiting their ignorant
427 landlords), and this ended with the interference of the administration.
K When this happened the peasants usually petitioned for the
427 formation of a Russian settlement on the land occupied by them.
648 There were 317 of these families in the oblast when the first offi-
175 cial decision was made (in 1879) for the organization of the
Russian population in the region.

The first colonization of other localities on the Kirghiz Steppe -- in the Turgai oblast and the Pavlodar uyezd of the Semipalatinsk oblast -- also was possible and later took place on the basis of rental agreements. The natural and necessary transition from the rental use of the Kirghiz sectors to the use of their own landed property, however, always took place with difficulty, providing the Russian settlers of the steppe with every possible kind of trial and privation (in the Pavlodar uyezd it has not yet ceased).

H.T. The condition of the Russian colonization of the Kirghiz
175 krai in the 1870's was described thus in the most devoted report
167 for 1875 by General Kaznakov, one of the most outstanding
648 Governor Generals of Western Siberia.

241 "The situation in the steppe oblasts," we read in this report,
K "demands special attention. Since the time the Kirghiz /Kazak/
175 accepted Russian sovereignty, their progress in becoming civilized
648 has been nil. The attempts to change to agriculture have been
177 virtually only those introduced by the Chinese government. Mean-
[241] while, as long as the Kirghiz /Kazak/ follow the huge orbits of
their nomadic rounds alone in the desert expanses of the steppes
far from the Russian population, they will remain loyal subjects
only in name and will count themselves as Russians only in the
H.T. census. The Kazak /Cossacks/ who are adjacent to them along
175 the line do not help the situation, being few in number, and they
648 have even, one by one, learned the Kirghiz /Kazak/ dialect and
177 adopted some of the customs, harmless ones, by the way, of the
nomadic people."

/204 cont./
538 recent period. These are singers of the national grief, the
533 spokesmen of the needs and situations of the poorest segment of
the Kirghiz /Kazak/ -- the dzhetak /or djetak/. At the same
time their songs also have an accusing tone (concerning the
persecutions and injustices resulting from the power of the rich).
One can point to "Zarzaman" (The Lament of Time) of
Chortanbai as a satiric work of the most recent period, revealing
rather successfully the failings of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ as they
538 have been created under the influence of Russian rule. Finally,
one should mention Knombai (in the Semipalatinsk uyezd) as a
representative of a new tendency in Kirghiz /Kazak/ poetry.
He is the author of many poems that are elegant in form and
poetic in content (especially in descriptions of nature). This
538 same man has made good translations of "Eugene Onegin" and of
●177 many poems by Lermontov (which have shown themselves to be
most understandable to the Kirghiz /Kazak/. Thus one can
[533] hear among the "olengchi" (singers) of Semipalatinsk the
"letter of Tatiana" /from "Eugene Onegin"/, for example, sung,
of course, to their own melody.

538 Lyric works, however, are most characteristic of Kirghiz
/Kazak/ poetry. They, too, are simple and uningenious, like
the nomadic life.

[212] In the absence of literacy all the works are transmitted
orally, and this role is played by special persons -- the "akyny"
and "olengchi" (like the psaltery and kobza players of old Rus').
The former not only transmit old songs, but also compose new
ones. The "olengchi," however, usually engage in "rhyming,"
paying less attention to the content than to keeping the rhyme
and the successful comparison.

538 All the above-mentioned types of folklore are not told
533 /205/ but sung. Singing plays an eminent role among the
Kirghiz /Kazak/ (primarily monophonic), and the most important moments in life cannot pass without it.

533 On first impression the Kirghiz /Kazak/ song seems
musically unpleasant. If one listens carefully, however, the
originality, simplicity, and inner sense of the melody produce

/207 cont./

342 described, which are more convenient in certain cases. The
kosh consists of three "kanat" (sections) of kerege. It has no
chengarak, and the uka are consolidated at the upper ends. The
kosh is used for traveling guests during the frequent journeys,
and by shepherds with the herd. The dzholum-uy is a yurt for
traveling and is distinguished by its smaller dimensions. It is
[177] covered by only a tuurlyk and a tyunduk. These yurts have begun
to come into use in the Russian armies which move about in
the southern strip of the region, and they are known as
"dzholomeyka."

The ablaycha consists only of uka driven into the ground,
with a chengarak made firm at the upper end, and it is covered
with one piece of felt. It is used mostly on long migrations and
[175] journeys. The ablaycha originated in the time of the khan
Ablai (18th century), whose army used such yurts. /Illustration
appears here./ Among the ordinary yurts there are two types,
the conical or Torgout type and the Kirghiz /Kazak/ cupola-shaped
one. The former is rarely seen and is used in special
cases.

342 Just as the peasant hut has a "beautiful corner" or honored
554 place, the Kirghiz /Kazak/ yurt has a place, opposite the door,
352 that is considered honorific and is arranged with chests and
353 covered with rugs. The honored guest is seated here on a rug,
[574] syrmak (embroidered felt) or blanket. The master's half of the
tent is the part on the right, nearest the door, and is partitioned
off with a screen made of chiy grass or a curtain. Food products,
[262] the kazan (a kettle on a tripod), a "saba" (sack made of
smoked leather, "baursaki," cold meat, etc. are kept here.
The bed, called "tyusek-oruk" (a low bed with pillows) stands
along the wall. This is the master's place. Next to it is the
chest, "kebezhe," with the best plates and dishes, tea, and
sugar. The left side of the tent (near the entrance) is considered
the back; a place is made here for the dog, the young ram,
and the golden eagle. The poor beggars also sit here in the
tents of the rich Kirghiz /Kazak/. A place is made on the
left side also for the adult or married children. There is no
furniture, except a low round table (in one corner) for eating.

/215 cont. /
423 in the use of land exists because of this. Thus, one clan has a thou-
sand dessiatine of land to a yurt, while another has a few score, a
423 great deal if as high as a hundred dessiatine. The intensified coloniza-
● 177 tion of the steppes has accentuated this abnormality. Finally the
general path of development of the economic life of the Kirghiz
178 /Kazak/ cannot help but promote it, namely, the appearance of
565 agriculture, the transition in some places from a natural (livestock)
economy to a monetary one, and in connection with this the dis-
integration of the patriarchal system. The contemporary nomadic
village no longer represents families of equal rights. In each one it
is possible to distinguish several
well-to-do families on whom
all the rest of the population
of the village is economically
dependent. This sort of situa-
[566] tion (and the dzhetak system)
is getting stronger every year,
[291 and especially in the years of
492] "dzhuta" (hunger).

→ The former patriarchal re-
lations have been retained (in
part) in the customary law in
the family.

At the fair in Uil. (From a photograph
by A. N. Chagin.)

[692 The court among the modern Kirghiz /Kazak/ consists of "biy"
614] (elders in the clan who formerly inherited this duty in the clan from
generation to generation). Now the biy is elected by 100-200 yurts
(but he can only be a person no younger than 25, who has not been
tried and punished). The court of the biy has jurisdiction over all
cases concerning alien property and lawsuits in general up to 500 rubles
(but not criminal cases). In addition, final judgments can be made
on lawsuits involving sums no higher than 30 rubles. In cases above
this norm the persons being judged can appeal to an assembly of volost
biy (under the /216/ chairmanship of the uyezd chief, and now of the

/219 cont./

585 gift from him, not to speak of the special and obligatory ones,
[431] such as "lyu," the gift to the bride's father and kinsmen,
"syuzaky" to the family "for the milk of the mother," etc. The
groom continues to come and visit the bride for a certain length
of time (a year, sometimes more or less). He brings the remaining
part of the bride-money, and livestock as a gift ("toy mal")
to compensate for the expenses of the wedding. In addition
pieces of felt are brought for the yurt which is put up especially
for his visit. The wooden parts are given by the bride in her
dowry. The bride is led to the new yurt, and the celebration
begins, during which a didactic song, "Zhar, zhar," is sung
(literal translation: "concerning two halves"), in which advice
is given as to what sort of wife the bride must be. After this
the yurt and the entire dowry of the bride are packed, and the
bridal couple (the bride in her wedding attire) ride to the village
of the groom, accompanied by the bride's mother. Upon their
entrance into the tent, fat is poured on the hearth and there is
[178] kneeling. The groom's mother reads instructions to the bride
and with a short staff raises the veil from the bride's face (a
new custom, not known among the simple Kirghiz /Kazak/.
After this, a new celebration begins, with games and in particular
585 lar racing. Under the influence of Islam the ritual of marriage
177 takes place after the groom enters the tent. A mullah reads a
prayer in Arabic (which, consequently, no one understands) over
a cup of water in which a coin is placed and then asks the
bridal couple for their consent, gives them the water to drink,
and then gives it to all those present, keeping the coin for him-
585 self. After her arrival in the village, the bride does not have
553 the right to call the men by their names, but must give them
new names (a survival indicating the subservient and low position
of the woman in the family).

582 Most of the marriages take place when the bride is 14-18
years of age and the groom is 18-20. There are also grooms
595 75 years old and grooms in the cradle. Although Moslem law
permits polygamy for the Kirghiz /Kazak/, it is not widespread
since it requires great expenditures and is possible only for the
rich. Most of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ have two wives (an old one
and a young one).

/220 cont./

793 to supplement their education they travel to the learned centers of Islam -- to Bukhara, Khiva, Tashkent, and Samarkand (1).

> 1. The volost mullah is called akhun. The chief spiritual figure (with the power of our /Eastern Orthodox/ bishop /arkhierey/) is the Mufti, who lives in European Russia.

779 Recently, with the intensification of connections with the Moslems
177 of Central Asia, /221/ Islam has begun to take deeper root.
788 /Illustration appears here./ This can be deduced indirectly by
the increase of pilgrimages to Mecca. In 1901 up to 300
pilgrimage tickets were issued in Omsk.

Among the holidays we will mention "Kurbanayz" ("the
796 sacrifice," symbolizing the offering of Isaac as a sacrifice). On
782 this holiday it is necessary to slaughter (offer as a sacrifice) the
best male animal (horse or bull, "so that in the other world, when
the sinners are driven through hell along a thin tightrope as sharp
as a saber, they will have something on which to ride"). Usually
one animal is slaughtered for every seven persons. According to
an old custom the rich invite all the poor of the village to eat
with them. The hides of the animals go to the mullah. The
796 holiday is accompanied by games and amusements. Of these the
526 races, in which girls also take part, are popular. The adults
delight in the running of their best racers, while the young people
amuse themselves by chasing each other. If a young man catches
a girl, he is permitted to kiss her. If he fails to catch her, the
girl will chase him back. This is a movable holiday.

In memory of the fasting of Mohammed, there has been
796 established a thirty-day "uraza" (fast), and the month of this
785 fast is called "Ramazan." During this time the Kirghiz /Kazak/
is obliged to renounce food and drink from sunrise ("as soon as
only a thread is visible") until sundown. Eating is permissible
only at night. The Kirghiz /Kazak/ have adapted themselves
to this by eating and drinking all night and sleeping during the
daytime. In winter this fast passes easily, but in summer, when

BRIEF

The Kazakhs, one of the major Turkic peoples in the USSR, live in a strategic area 101
in the heart of Soviet Central Asia. There are evidences of deep and continuing conflict 177
between their way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Soviet Communists.
This study was intended to describe those sources of conflict and to indicate their impli- 181
cations for psychological warfare. A secondary objective of the study was to determine
how well the vulnerabilities of a people inaccessible to direct methods of research can
be assessed.

The traditional Kazakh way of life is pastoral nomadism; they abhor the settled 648
farming life. Their customs and values reflect this independent heritage, and the Soviet [181]
drive during the 1930's to collectivize the nomads met with resistance. Between 1926
and 1939, the Kazakhs suffered a net population loss of almost one million—nearly one- [161]
fourth of their number in 1926. This loss was the result of starvation and disease, mass
arrests and liquidations, flight across the border, and migration to neighboring Turkic
peoples and to the urban and industrial areas of Siberia, all factors indirectly attributable [167]
to the imposition of Soviet control.

The organization of Kazakh society according to kin groups has been an important [602]
factor in contact with the Soviets. It has eased Kazakh transition to collective life, since
most collective farms comprise single groups of blood relatives, but at the same time the
closeness of the family ties has frequently led to the charge of nepotism by the Soviets.

The nativistic revival of Kazakh interest in their traditional heroes and customs [668]
was encouraged by the Soviets as a wartime morale measure. This revival—at once polit-
ical, religious, and cultural in nature—became so strong that the Soviets considered it a
threat and have attempted to suppress it. The importance of blood ties to the Kazakhs
heightened their resentment of Soviet condemnation of their national heroes, whom they
regard also as their ancestors. The Kazakhs' veneration of their past history and culture [771]
is fostered by their native religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. This folk
religion is not formally organized. Administratively, the Soviets treat the Kazakhs as
Moslems, although it is difficult to say how much Islam has influenced the rural Kazakhs.

The Kazakhs appear to be making only a minimal contribution to important republic
activities which the Soviets are trying to encourage—industry and transport, Party and
government. One explanation may be that the Kazakhs are not given equal opportunities;
there is some evidence that the Slavs regard them as inferiors. Another reason is that
the Kazakhs are not coming forward for training and advancement. Apparently they prefer
to keep apart from the Slavic population of the republic; this conclusion is supported by
the low rate of intermarriage between the two peoples. The Kazakhs appear to be opposed [159]
to many aspects of Sovietization, but at present their resistance is largely passive.

The local press proved to be a most useful source of information in the present
study. The reports of local reactions and activities in relation to the official Party line 127
provided many indications of strengths and weaknesses, trouble spots and failures. In
addition to this source, research methods from many disciplines were combined to utilize
all available data and information.

121 reasonably be expected to persist over time and which indicate probable vulnerabilities to psychological warfare.

COMMUNICATIONS

Because psychological warfare depends ultimately upon the ability to communicate, the existing patterns and facilities for communication have been given considerable attention in the report. These data are concerned not only with radio communications, literacy rates, and similar factors of importance in communicating from a distance, but also with motion pictures and book publishing, which are important during consolidation operations. Such scanty data as are available are given on the distribution of ethnic groups in the republic as a whole and within cities, a matter of importance in helping to define the limits of informal or word-of-mouth communication. Even more scanty, but highly important, are the few available indications of the direction and amount of uncontrolled flow of Turkic peoples back and forth between the USSR and Afghanistan, Iran, and other countries.

COLLECTIVIZATION

181 Among the many characteristics of Kazakh culture which have stood
in the way of successful adaptation to Soviet policy, their centuries-old
221 dedication to a life of pastoral nomadism has consistently created the
most acute problems—problems which became disastrous for the
Kazakhs during the collectivization drive of the 1930's. For generations
[833] the Kazakhs had led their flocks of sheep and goats in a yearly round
between winter and summer grazing areas, traveling in bands whose
[621] members were united by bonds of kinship and led by the senior men.
Like so many nomads they were proud of their way of life and viewed
agriculture and the sedentary life it implies as both unmanly and degrad-
[462] ing. The small amount of farming which was occasionally done was per-
[560] formed by women, who have always occupied a subordinate position in
Kazakh society, and by slaves and the poor.

[567] The determination of the Soviet regime to settle the Kazakhs, along
with the other peoples of the USSR, on collective farms met with resist-
648 ance and cost hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs their livelihood and
● 177 their lives. The net loss in Kazakh population in the period 1926-1939
amounted to almost one million; if one takes into account the normal
[161] increase otherwise to be expected during this time (based on figures for
the USSR as a whole) the figure is closer to one and a half million.

Some compromises were made during the later phases of collectivization, but the basic conflict remains and manifests itself in a number of different ways. The Kazakhs are among those affected by a plan for massive cultural change which the Soviets believe will eventually create a society uniformly organized in accordance with "socialist reality." Thus far, however, cultural change in Kazakhstan has failed in many ways to proceed according to plan.

"FAMILY RELATIONS"

K 602 648 197

The organization of Kazakh society by kin groups, bound together by strong ties of blood relationship into disciplined and cooperative units, has both interfered with Soviet planning and increased the extent of Kazakh suffering. The resistance of one person involves all his relatives in the ensuing punishment. At the same time these large family groupings do not fit into the Soviet conception of social and economic organization. The Soviets have, in fact, an explicit policy against "family relations." This phrase has two meanings, one literal, the other figurative. Literally it means nepotism, the use of his position by a man in power to obtain a good post for a relative. Figuratively, it denotes personal relationships on the job, relationships which the Soviet regime feels may permit one person to cover up the failings of another, and which may even become conspiratorial.

KN 601

In Kazakh society all action and decision take place within the framework of very literal "family relations," and this pattern inevitably is carried over into Soviet-sponsored activities. The bulk of the membership of a collective farm in Kazakhstan today is likely to comprise a single group of blood relatives, its leaders the older men of the group. This is particularly true of those areas in which herding remains important. The retention of kin group solidarity, where it has been permitted, has had two important effects. It has eased the adjustment of the Kazakhs to collectivization, while at the same time making possible maximum cooperation between collective farm members in covering up violations of Soviet directives and policy.

K 156

The problem becomes even more acute when Kazakhs are drawn into industry and into the Party and government. They naturally try to surround themselves with their relatives. Paradoxically, Soviet policy has often tended to foster this tendency; political affiliation, like everything else among the Kazakhs, tends to be a family matter, and a willingness to cooperate with the Communists is confined to certain—usually a very few—families in a given locality. Yet, political (Communist) reliability is necessary for admission into governmental, Party, and technical fields. Hence if Kazakhs are to be utilized at all in these activities, the chances are good that many of them will be related, whether through deliberate nepotism or not. And with this go all the hazards the Soviets see in "family relations."

SOVIET ADMINISTRATION

K 648

In general, the Kazakhs participate only to a restricted degree in higher-level activities, particularly those which the Soviets feel are vital for the building and consolidating of the USSR—industry, transport, the Party, and government. There appear to be two reasons for this. The first is that the Slavs do not extend to the Kazakhs equal opportunity for training and advancement. Experiences reported by Turkic soldiers captured from mixed units in World War II suggest that they are generally looked upon as inferiors. Furthermore, in a society in which political

K 648 reliability is essential for advancement, the Slavs are understandably hesitant to place the Kazakhs in positions of responsibility and trust, whether this involves "family relations" or not. The second reason is K that the Kazakhs simply are not coming forward to be trained and promoted. [562] This is seen especially in the virtual absence of Kazakh women [181] in positions of any responsibility. Here Kazakh and Communist values are completely opposite. In theory, if not in practice, Soviet women are considered the equals of men, whereas the Kazakhs, in both theory and actuality, keep their women in a very subordinate status. But it is also apparent that the men themselves are not becoming any more involved than they have to in the activities most emphasized by the Soviets, and K where they can they are holding onto their old values and traditional way [154] of life, meeting the Soviet demands with essentially passive resistance.

It must be presumed that Kazakh participation in Soviet affairs will K increase over time under the continuing pressure exerted. Neverthe- [177] less, the Sovietization of the Kazakhs remains sufficiently unsatisfactory, after nearly 40 years of effort expended in this direction, to provide KN assurance that the process is far from complete.

665 The nonparticipation of Kazakhs in Soviet developments presents a serious dilemma not only for the regime as a whole but also for the local Communist Party. The primary function of the Party in the Soviet system is to inspire or coerce the people to ever greater efforts toward the goals specified by the regime. Although the Party "carries a big stick," and is supported in this by the entire apparatus of the State, including the secret police, it is obvious that coercion alone is not sufficient to maintain a consistently high rate of output in the daily activities of any people. For this reason the Party uses the carrot as well as the stick, and the various devices used to stimulate production and increase enthusiasm for Soviet objectives are, with the majority of USSR citizens, quite effective. Whatever their real feelings toward the regime and its policies, these citizens see no alternative to living within the framework KN of Soviet society and making their way in accordance with its standards.

The Kazakhs, on the other hand, feel they do have an alternative— 665 their old way of life and its deeply entrenched values, which are still very 563 much alive. This is not the road to riches, but few of them have ever had K reason to hope for riches. As a result the Kazakhs generally put forth only the minimum necessary effort. [154] Not only do they have little interest in industry and transport, but their output is consistently below expectations in agriculture and even in herding, their traditional occupation.

Thus the Party, under constant pressure from Moscow to increase output, finds itself equipped with techniques for encouraging production which are not adapted to dealing with a people who do not view their integration into Soviet society as inevitable. There remain only force and coercion, but these cannot be applied steadily enough to be effective with an entire people. When force was tried during the collectivization drive of the 1930's, the result was a net loss in production from which the economy of Kazakhstan has never fully recovered. Actually, the purges of which the western world is aware tend to be directed more toward the overwhelmingly Slavic membership of the Party, caught on the horns of its dilemma, than toward the Kazakhs who are the cause of the difficulty.

KN 563 665 Kazakhs who are tried-and-true Communists. Moscow, however, repeatedly criticizes the local Party for the small proportion of natives in positions of administrative responsibility. One result of this pressure is that the Party is forced to accept into its own ranks and those of government and industry marginally reliable persons who, if put to the test, would very possibly prove more loyal to their Kazakh nationality than to their Soviet citizenship. K [121] These marginal people—Kazakh and Communist at the same time—deserve particular attention as targets for psychological warfare, because of their psychological vulnerability and also their crucial position as mediators between two cultures.

RELIGION

KN 798 The religion of the Kazakhs provides the Soviets with yet another problem of policy, at both the local and the Moscow level. Totalitarian governments in general seem to view religion as a threat which must be either neutralized or made captive to serve their own ends. The Communists are no exception. In the Soviet Union they have developed an approach to each of the major organized religions, which has proved more or less successful in attaining these ends.

Most of the Turkic peoples of Soviet Central Asia are thoroughgoing and conservative Moslems. Toward them the Soviets have adopted the familiar procedures of installing puppet leaders and attacking those aspects of the religion which they view as potentially dangerous. K [771] But their established techniques and procedures fail to fit the Kazakh pattern. The Moslem religion has had some influence on the Kazakhs, but the aspects of Islam which they have adopted are largely superficial in nature; they still believe in what is essentially a folk religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. During the Tsarist era this fact was apparently never clearly recognized. One assumes that the Communists know better, but their knowledge evidently has not equipped them to deal adequately with the unusual religious blend of Kazakh beliefs and practices. Also, because Kazakh religion is largely local in nature, it has no strong "commanding heights" of organization which can be subverted in order to deliver believers to Communist control.

As a result of this dilemma, most Kazakhs have been singularly free of attack on religious grounds. K [177] Actually, since the Soviets are forced for lack of a better designation to treat the Kazakhs administratively as Moslems, they are in effect in the paradoxical position of encouraging rather than discouraging the Islamic aspect of Kazakh religion. However, although continuing contact with Uzbeks in Southern Kazakhstan has increased the strength of the Moslem religion among some Kazakhs, the old folk religion has retained much of its strength and integrity, and it promises to remain for many years another bulwark of the traditional Kazakh way of life.

K 121 This summary has stressed those aspects of Kazakh culture and recent history most likely to be of pertinent use in planning divisive psychological warfare intended to deflect Kazakh energies away from the objectives of the Soviet regime. The manner of future psychological

595 Traditionally, the Kazakh was permitted to have more than one wife.
However, very few men were able to afford the expense involved, because
[583] marriage required large payments by the family of the groom to the family
[554] of the bride. For those who could afford it, the possession of many
wives meant an increase in prestige and status. Sometimes a man took
another wife because he had not had any sons by the first wife. But in
general, even though plural wives were permitted, such marriages were
[162] few in number. In 1926, only 104.5 women were reported as married
per 100 married men, exclusive of widows and divorcees. In Tsarist
[648] times the number was not much larger. At present polygamy is forbidden
by law. Nevertheless, it is stubbornly maintained by the Kazakhs,
and cases are constantly being reported and denounced in the Soviet
[554] press. It is still a matter of status and prestige; the bulk of the polygamous
marriages reported today involve men of high position in Soviet
life, such as Kazakhs who are presidents of collective farms.

233 The Kazakh herds are composed of sheep, goats, cattle, horses, and
camels, usually in that numerical order. Herds cannot be maintained
221 through the entire year in one place, because the grass on the steppes
is not rich enough to support them. They must move from month to
month and from season to season. However, there are too many herdsmen
and not enough steppeland to permit indiscriminate wandering. The
usual pattern is for a nomadic camp to set up winter quarters where
many smaller herding groups come together for religious and economic
purposes. Here they store their hay through the winter to feed the livestock,
and put up windbreaks against the winter storms. In the early
spring they disperse into smaller herding groups of a few families each,
and proceed over traditionally fixed grazing routes to the summer camp
which they occupy until early fall. Nomadism is a fixed annual round of
movement, not a haphazard one.

166 The 1926 census reported that 5.6 per cent of the Kazakh males had
established residence outside the district in which they had been born.
The comparable figure for women was 20 per cent. The explanation for
591 this difference lies in the marriage customs, under which a Kazakh
woman traditionally moves to her husband's family residence. It is
almost unheard of for a man to move to the home of his wife's kin or
for both to move together to a new residence. Most of the marriages
involved a woman's moving only a short distance to her husband's family.
But at least a fifth of the women had to move away from their native
[584] districts; this usually meant that the marriage had been arranged for
them at some distance from their birthplaces.

No significant changes in Kazakh life had taken place by the time
177 the first Soviet census was taken in 1926. The first few years of Sovietization
had left the Kazakhs more or less untouched. Their economic
648 life, their family life, and the traditional organization of their society
had changed only externally. They had come under the unified rule of
Moscow instead of continuing their own loose social groupings, but
Moscow had not yet begun the transformation of Kazakh life, nor had the
Kazakhs yet faced the problems involved in accommodating to or resisting
Soviet influence.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

THE PERIOD 1926-1939

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At the end of the 1920's the Soviets decided to collectivize the nomads of Central Asia, by which they meant causing them to settle down in collective farms. The first Five-Year Plan envisaged settling 383,000 of these nomadic households by 1933. By 1930, 50,000 nomadic Kazakh households were so immobilized, but 567,000 out of 829,000 households, or 67 per cent, were still nomadic. During the following year, 95,000 more households were transferred from nomadism to farming and other sedentary occupations. In 1932 an intensive drive was started to collectivize the nomadic herdsmen as well, but without compulsory sedentarization; collectivization no longer meant settling down.

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Apparently, many of those nomads who had been sedentarized in the first Five-Year Plan did not remain on the farms. Kazakhs traditionally abhorred farming. They regarded it as woman's work, as work of the poor and of those who could not make a success of herding. For a man to become a farmer meant loss of status, loss of manhood and virility. The Sarts, for example, a farming and trading people of Central Asia composed of former herdsmen, were despised by the nomads. Only half of those households which had been announced as collectivized remained so. In 1934, it was announced that only 76,000 households of the 145,000 noted above had been permanently settled in 1932. Between 1933 and 1935 slightly under 200,000 households were added to this roll, making a total of about one quarter of a million households which had been sedentarized. In addition, there was some movement of nomad households across the border into other republics or into China. In 1935 there were 158,000 fully nomadic Kazakh households, as compared with 567,000 five years earlier.

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The total number of those employed in Kazakhstan in 1931 was 495,100, of whom 125,100 were in agriculture. By 1935 the total figure had risen to 585,700, and the agricultural component to 165,800. The total figure rose to about 700,000 in 1937 and to 820,000 in 1940.

There were 16,184 persons employed in industry in Kazakhstan in 1927, of whom 20.8 per cent were Kazakhs. In 1933, the number of industrial workers had risen to 56,484; of these, 23,784, or 42.1 per cent, were Kazakhs. At the end of 1934, the total was 71,627, of whom 29,022 or 40.5 per cent were Kazakhs.

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The total population of Kazakhs was reported in 1926 as 3,968,289; in 1939 their number was given as 3,098,764. They had thus lost in absolute terms about 900,000 people between the two censuses, or approximately 22 per cent of their number in 1926. In the same period, the population of the entire USSR had increased by 15.9 per cent. It has been argued that under normal conditions the Kazakh rate of increase would have been higher than the average for the USSR as a whole. (The populations of the neighboring republics of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, for instance, which are composed of ethnic groups similar to the Kazakhs, have increased at a rate much higher than that of the entire USSR.) At any rate, if the Kazakhs had increased only at the USSR average rate, they would have numbered about 4,500,000 in 1939. Thus their real loss

161 may be estimated at approximately 1,400,000, if one adds to the actual
loss of 900,000 the expected natural increase of 500,000.

A number of arguments have been advanced to account for both the
648 actual and the estimated losses. Each has a certain merit, and no single
one of them should be pursued at the expense of all the others.

The Soviet explanation is that people from Kazakhstan moved away
[167] to the new industrial enterprises of the southern Urals and southern
Siberia and to the neighboring Central Asia republics, the Uzbek, Tadzhik,
Turkmen, and Kirgiz SSR's. This interpretation has not been accompanied by any data. The figures quoted here have been the totals of those
listed as Kazakhs in the USSR censuses regardless of place of residence.
Therefore, the Soviet statement must mean not only that hundreds of
thousands of Kazakhs migrated from Kazakhstan to other parts of the
USSR, but also that they gave up their Kazakh nationality in doing so.

This may be part of the story but it cannot be the whole. It is known
[177] that the Russians looked with favor on the Russification of native populations and their absorption into the Russian ethnic group, regardless of
their forebears. German and Austrian prisoners of war who were sent
to Kazakhstan report that many Kazakhs, identifiable by their physiognomy, by their personal and family names, and by their own account of
161 their past, were nevertheless designated Russian in their official papers.
648 But certainly 900,000 of them did not become Russian.

During the course of collectivization many Kazakhs were liquidated
[474] by the GPU, primarily during the period between the two censuses.
Those liquidated were people who resisted collectivization, but they
[565] were listed as remnants of the former nobility and wealthy people of
Kazakhstan. This class was known as the feudal bays. About 700 bay
families per year were liquidated, that is turned over to the GPU, during
the three-year period 1928-1930. In 1931 it was announced that 23,000
households of bays were to be liquidated. This made an announced total
of 25,000 households subject to GPU measures. If all these people were
actually liquidated (that is, left to starve or otherwise badly treated),
then some 125,000 Kazakhs were eliminated by these means. This is the
largest figure for population losses that can be assigned to police measures on the basis of published data.

[233] It has been stated that between 1930 and 1935, at the height of the
drive for collectivization, the number of Kazakh households engaged in
[162] the traditional herding occupation dropped from 567,000 to 158,000.
Many of these households went into agriculture and some into industry
[167] in Kazakhstan, but others moved across the border, either into neighboring republics or out of the Soviet realm into bordering China. During
the 1920's and the first part of the 1930's considerable cross-border
movement was still permitted into China and back, according to age-old
nomadic patterns. The border was closed in the mid-1930's, and
possibly some Kazakhs remained outside the USSR by choice; for
example, there is a colony of approximately 30,000 Kazakhs in Outer
Mongolia. However, to assign numbers to the population loss in Soviet
Kazakhstan through this cross-border movement is a hopeless task.

Again, no reliable estimate has been given for the number of
Kazakhs who might have gone over to the neighboring republics within
the Soviet Union.

161 died or changed their way of life. This fact lies behind the great drop in the number of Kazakh nomadic households, from 567,000 in 1930 to one-fourth that amount, 158,000, in 1935.

It will be recalled that between 1926 and 1939 the Kazakh population suffered an absolute loss of 900,000, and a projected loss of 1,400,000, figured on the 15.9 average rate of increase for the entire Soviet Union. The major factors which contributed to this decline may now be summarized:

[165] (1) Starvation through loss of herds during the period of the first great collectivization drive, 1929-1933.
(2) The poor conditions of life and the prevalence of famine and disease during the early period of collectivization.
(3) Mass arrests and liquidations of resisters to collectivization ("enemies of the people").
[167] (4) Border crossings by Kazakhs into Sinkiang and Mongolia.
(5) Kazakh migration to the neighboring Turkic peoples, primarily the Karakalpaks and the Uzbeks.
[177] (6) Russification of Kazakhs who moved to the new urban developments of southern Siberia.

The population losses in any single category cannot be estimated with accuracy; one can only list those factors contributing to population loss with comments about their relative significance. The major factor was undoubtedly starvation through loss of herds and through the conditions attending collectivization. The flight across the borders into countries outside the USSR is a dramatic factor, but not one which accounts [167] for large numbers. There are no signs of a great increase in the population of Sinkiang, for example, in the early 1930's. The total population of Sinkiang is small, and an influx of hundreds of thousands of people could not have passed unnoticed, especially since there were western observers in the area at the time.

The movement of Kazakhs into the cities of southern Siberia, presumably in the Urals and the Kuzbass, is the official Russian explanation. This explanation cannot be the whole story but must be accepted as a part of the truth. That is, Kazakhs who are urbanized, speak Russian [177] habitually, and work in Russian factories seek a Russian nationality listing. They have been encouraged to do so at certain periods of Soviet [369] history, primarily in the 1930's.

The factor of GPU arrests and liquidation, together with attendant [165] factors such as starvation among those who were not themselves liquidated but whose herds were, may account for a maximum of 125,000 Kazakhs. The last major factor is the flight of Kazakhs to other neigh- [167] boring nationalities. A minor factor related to this last is the low rate of increase among those Kazakhs resident in areas outside Kazakhstan.

KAZAKH POPULATION IN 1939

161 131 A total of 3,100,000 Kazakhs was listed for the USSR as a whole in the 1939 census. Approximately 84 per cent were resident in Kazakhstan, nearly 10 per cent lived in Uzbekistan and Karakalpakia, and the rest

each clan had a territory distinctly its own, separated by widely recognized boundaries from the territories of neighboring clans. Lineages within each clan likewise had pasture lands of their own, the land of each lineage separate from the others; villages had separate lands for their own grazing, and known routes over which they moved from pasturage to pasturage in a fixed annual round.[4] 61 631

There is thus a correlation between neighborhood and kinship; the closest neighbor of the Kazakh household head was most likely to be his brother, father, father's brother, or father's brother's son. This close relation between the two social bonds is of more than theoretical interest; it has been the basis for an ideological warfare among various Soviet camps in different periods of recent history. Another feature of Kazakh society clarifies this relationship between kinship and neighborhood. The social bond of the Kazakhs, the means whereby two individuals demonstrate their membership in the common society of Kazakhdom, is the genealogical tree. Because of Kazakh nomadism, the relationships among the different branches, whether clans or lineages or villages, are loose, occasional. If two Kazakhs meet and are unknown to each other, they trace their genealogies for each other until a common ancestor is found. This common ancestor then becomes the point of reference for the two, the means whereby they establish whether they are more or less equals, or if not, which is superior. The ancestor in common establishes a basis for mutual aid and cooperation. 602 [648]

The number of generations traced in the genealogies to a common ancestor determines the closeness of the relationship; the fewer the generations, the closer the kinship, and the closer in space are the villages, camps, and pasturages of the Kazakhs. These genealogies are the membership roll, the constitution, the charter of incorporation, and the historical record of the different groups; they are either recited baldly, in answer to questions concerning ancestry, or they are the skeleton around which folk epics are created.[5] These folk epics, which have suffered a peculiar fate under the Soviets, are long recitations or chants concerning the deeds of the ancestors. The Soviet-era epics of Djambul are quite different; Djambul's so-called epics are songs in praise of Stalin. [631] 173 [177]

Kazakh descent lines are not all equal; a father who is the founding ancestor of all the members of a horde or clan or village may have several sons, who are ranked according to their order of birth, the eldest son having the highest rank. The descendants of the sons will then recognize among themselves a relative rank order according to which of the sons they were descended from. The father or founding ancestor of the entire line is himself a member of a still larger group with rank according to order of birth and descent.[6] 611

The division of Kazakh society into social classes is also related to the ranking of descent lines. The same ties of blood and common 565

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[4] Radloff (105), 1891, pp. LI-LVI.

[5] Samoilovich, in Rudenko *et al*, 1930, pp. 306 ff. For a genealogy still preserved today, see Mukanov, 1947, pp. 1-28.

[6] Kharuzin, 1889, pp. 41-42.

171 one should remember that the paternal authority of the Chinese, the
Japanese, or the Romans is a model for the imperial authority only by
analogy, as a manner of speaking. The Confucian admonition to regard
the emperor as a father is not taken literally. The Chinese imperial
authority pattern is derived from other sources than the paternal role;
[602] so is the Kazakh. But Kazakh society as a whole is more steeped in the
kinship relation, and hence authority in general is modeled on the paternal
to a greater degree than in the other patrilineal societies mentioned.

642 Age is the underlying basis of authority in the Kazakh social system,
since the old men are the fathers. Paradoxically, traditional Kazakh
538 literature, both oral and written, deals mostly with young heroes. These
youths are praised for their daring, strength, cleverness; they defy
enemies both human and supernatural. But the hero is typically a
[428] younger prince who gains a kingdom in defiance of the law of primogeniture
by subduing or outwitting his older brother; the young prince
never defies the older generation. The father and elders generally
support the elder brother, but they do not actively suppress the younger.
In contrast, Kazakh literature of the Soviet era depicts youth defying or
combatting his elders.

KAZAKH SOCIETY AND THE PARTY LINE

171 Throughout the history of western society, the social classes have
565 been distinguished by differences in birth; the nobility carefully separated
themselves from the taint of common blood in medieval Europe,
in Renaissance societies, and in modern times. The Kazakh society—
and the Mongol or Uzbek for that matter—is anomalous because it
maintains class distinctions of aristocrat and commoner while affirming
[619] a general relatedness through descent from a single ancestor. There
are even fictional genealogies which unite all steppe nomads.[1]

554 These relatively simple anomalies have caused a dilemma in Soviet
publications on the nature of Kazakh society. There is social differentiation
not only by birth and descent, but also by wealth. In Kazakh society,
● [177] the two bases of social inequality were more or less coordinate until
the victory of Sovietization. The clan leader was superior to his fellow
[222] clansmen by right of birth; the village leader was superior to his fellow
villagers by right of birth; both were also richer than the other clansmen
or villagers. By right of precedence they allocated the best pasture
lands to themselves and decided all judicial questions in their own favor.
Both wealth and social influence were based on the number of kinsmen
[602] who would support a man at a council, or before the law, or in a fight,
a feud, or a war. A man of eminent birth and of wealth could get more
kinsmen to support him than could a Kazakh with neither. This might
seem anomalous, since theoretically a Kazakh is related to all other
Kazakhs, and kinsmen help each other. But kinsmen help closer kinsmen
before they help distant kin; and kinsmen help superior, influential kinsmen
before they help inferior kinsmen who are lacking in influence.

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[1] Aristov, 1894, pp. 296-298.

These apparent contradictions arise because Kazakh society is an amalgam of kin and political relationships. 182

Soviet writers in Central Asia find it difficult to explain the inconsistencies in Kazakh society; this difficulty is due in part to the series of readymade categories of evolution which Communism teaches. They are dealing not with abstractions but with living people, whose lives are complex. The Kazakhs have lived on the margins of great empires—Persian, Chinese, Russian—for many centuries. They themselves have participated in great empires, their own and others. Not only the glory, but some of the institutions, have rubbed off on them; they have developed certain institutions which are normally part of states and empires. At times they have formed states and empires, and at times they have contracted to form smaller units. 177

During the 1920's, a group of Kazakh intellectuals, together with certain romantically disposed Russians, constructed a picture of Kazakh society in which each social unit formed a closely-knit cooperative core. All members of a village helped each other, since all were united by ties of blood and neighborhood. The Kazakh intellectuals included former leaders, such as Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov, of the Alash-Orda, the Kazakh political party of the period 1917-1922. Ryskulov and Sadvokasov, also Kazakhs, propounded the same idea; the Russian scholars Polochanskii, Kushner, and, as late as 1933, Fedorov continued along the same line.[7] 829 [668]

With the onset of collectivization, the Soviet government could no longer let these theories continue unopposed. In 1926 Moscow began to denounce the notion of the persistence of primeval communist conditions among the Kazakhs into the era of the Russian Revolution. The Soviet boss of Kazakhstan, Goloshchekin, attacked the concept of the Kazakh nomadic village as a communal, cooperative, undifferentiated whole. Between 1928 and 1930 the government of Kazakhstan handed over each year to the GPU hundreds of Kazakh families classified as enemies of the workers. The campaign to exterminate the rich Kazakhs as exploiters of the poor intensified between 1930 and 1933. The aim of this campaign was to bring the Kazakh herdsman into collective farm life, to settle him down as a tiller of the soil, as well as to find the equivalents among the Kazakhs of the rich peasants of Russia. The aul was equated by Goloshchekin with a peasant village anywhere; the wealthy Kazakh villager was equated with the Kulak, and thus regarded as subject to liquidation.[8] 177 668 [474]

This policy became the official line, and the forces advocating the theory of communal economy and polity were silenced. One theory advanced in support of the new line stated that the Tsarist colonialists supported the village leaders as a counterpoise to the khans and the sultans, and used the local leader as a lever to crush the rule of the khans. According to this theory, the khans were of foreign birth and the village leaders, pictured as allies of the Tsars, were of Kazakh birth.[9]

[7] Togzhanov, 1934, pp. 6-8, 13.
[8] Goloshchekin, 1931, pp. 177-198, 208.
[9] Togzhanov, 1934, pp. 38-39.

177 648 According to the official line, Kazakh society belonged to the feudal stage of development at the time of the Russian conquest. This formulation has survived to the present day. It is supported by a stage theory of history, derived from Karl Marx. According to this theory, all societies prior to the Russian Revolution were either tribal or divided into classes; class societies were either capitalist or feudal. According to this theory the Kazakhs are not tribal because they are divided into classes, but they are not capitalist; therefore they are feudal. Never, however, did the proponents of this theory make a detailed comparison between Kazakh society and the nations of medieval Europe.

The Kazakhs, by this doctrine, were permitted to retain their [668] national heroes, the khans of old, among them the leaders of revolts against the Russian conquest, Batyr Srym, Taimanov, Kenesary, Nurmuhammed. In the Soviet Union of the 1930's, the Tsars were still considered hated oppressors of all men, Russians and non-Russians, in the Russian empire. The Tsars were an absolute and unrelieved evil, and a war for colonial liberation was progressive and good. Yet during the 1930's, writers tended to stay away from the description of these revolts against the Tsars by Kazakhs and other peoples. Most of the writings were concerned with such topics as Kazakh participation in the 1905 revolution, or the revolt of the Kazakhs in 1916. During World [538] War II, however, a number of books and articles were written describing the 19th century revolts as great events, true expressions of anti-Tsarist sentiment, part of the general hatred of Tsarism in which the Bolsheviks shared. Viatkin, Bekmakhanov, Shoinbaev and others—for the most part Kazakhs—wrote in admiration of the Kenesarys and Taimanovs.

Then with the 1950's began a violent purge of these writings. In the current phase, Tsarism is still regarded as an exploiting and oppressive institution, but a new twist has been added to the story. The Tsars by their conquests are now said to have saved the Turks of Central Asia from an even worse fate, conquest by English and the Germans, by Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. Pan-Turkism would bring all Turks together under one government—not that of Moscow—and is subjected to the most bitter denunciations by the Soviet press as bourgeois-nationalist, cosmopolitan, and so forth. Pan-Islamism would bring all Moslems together, Turks, Persians, and Arabs; although it is somewhat less realistic in its appeal to the Kazakhs, it is also sharply denounced in the Soviet press.

Whether England or Germany or the Pan-Turks would have swallowed up Central Asia is a matter of historical speculation which need not detain us here. On the other hand, the denunciation by the modern Soviet writers of the older Kazakh leaders such as Kenesary and Taimanov is of great interest. The Soviet specialists in Central Asia seek to differentiate Kazakh revolts into two types, those which were progressive and those which were not. The revolts of Nurmuhammed, Taimanov, and Kenesary Kasymov are all depicted as reactionary and antihistorical, because they sought to tear the Kazakhs away from the Russian empire and to retain the age-old oppression by the khans. Other figures such [668] as Batyr Srym are treated as progressive historically because they led a revolt not against the Tsars but against the nobility of their own society.

This distinction made between Batyr Srym and Kenesary by Soviet historians reflects the current Soviet attitude toward past leaders. These early khans who are now denounced are the national and cultural heroes of the Kazakhs. They are celebrated in the folk literature, the poetry, and the tales which parents tell their children; they are the basis of common comparisons ("as brave as . . ., as clever as . . ."). For the Kazakhs these figures are symbols of their unity as a people. Moreover, they are the ancestors of those living today, according to the traditional Kazakh ties of descent and blood. In denouncing them, the Soviets are denouncing and insulting the very people most venerated by the Kazakhs, aristocrats and commoners alike. 177 648 538

The hold of the olden khans still continues after more than 30 years of Soviet rule. The Kazakh native writers demonstrate a profound desire to seize upon these old figures for literary and historical themes. They stubbornly resist relinquishment of these themes when the official line changes anew. Despite three years of the sharpest attacks and polemics, adulation of the ancient heroes continues in the literature, in films, in classroom textbooks, in official histories; its eradication is a concern of the Soviet regime today.[1]

KAZAKH LIFE IN 1950

The preceding description of the traditional Kazakh society and culture was included not only as background to the present, but primarily because whole sectors of Kazakhs continue more or less unchanged in that way of life, even though they are now members of a collective farm. Traditional Kazakh culture includes forces which have blocked accommodation to the Soviet pattern and forces which have permitted Sovietization. These forces will be taken up in turn. 177 648

In rural Kazakhstan, Kazakhs live in collective farms either as herders or as combined herders and farmers. They form the greater proportion of the population in the regions which are primarily devoted to herding, western and west-central Kazakhstan. Here they continue the old nomad life, pasturing their herds of sheep, goats, horses, cattle, and camels from winter camp to summer, reversing their path and completing the cycle in the fall. The winter camps are the focal points of community life, the stable centers of the annual round. Here after the summer dispersal the Kazakhs return to large adobe houses, structures which contain not only quarters for the extended family, but also stables, connecting corridors, and rooms for the storage of hay. Some of these house-stable-barn structures are a century old; it was about one hundred years ago that domiciles of this type were introduced into the area.[2] 233 [241] [131] [221] [596] [342]

The extended families and villages have been the basis of Kazakh adaptation to Sovietization. Kazakh herders continue to live in kin units, with the old aul or nomadic village as the core of the herding 621 [177]

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[1] *Pravda*, 26 Dec 50, 19 Apr 51, and 28 Oct 52; *Voprosy Istorii*, 1951, No. 4, pp. 3-15.

[2] Korbe and Makhova, 1952, pp. 43-45.

621 kolkhoz. On the other hand, those Kazakhs who have changed from
herding to farming live in villages which are no longer kin communities.
The background of this differentiation antedates the Revolution, and is
an important part of Kazakh developments during the last hundred years.

In the period from 1850 to 1917 the Russians gradually took over
648 the more fertile sections of the steppe in the north, especially along
177 lake shores and river banks, and in mountain piedmont. This left less
steppe, and less fertile steppe, for the rapidly increasing Kazakh population.
The impoverished Kazakhs were impelled to take up agriculture,
which requires less territory per individual than does herding; in regions
having sufficient annual rainfall to support cultivation, farming is a
more efficient use of the land and hence permits greater density of population.
Where the Kazakhs were thus forced to take up agriculture,
they tended to break up the kinship units. The agricultural villages are
621 larger than the nomadic, and are composed of broken clans, broken
lineages, villages, and families.

Many Kazakh communities survived this impact and managed to
maintain their herding pattern, usually in conjunction with a certain
minimum amount of farming, which was done in the vicinity of the winter
camp by the women and the poor. Communities of this kind comprise
the norm to this day; farming among such villages and kolkhozy is
largely concerned with raising feed for the livestock. These communi-
474 ties have, as a general rule, gone over bodily into the collective farm
system. One such collective farm is the Belbasar Kolkhoz in the
621 Dzhambul region, in the valley of the Chu River. This farm is composed
of 116 households; of these 100 are Kazakh, all of the same lineage, the
Akhsha lineage of the Dulat clan of the Great Horde. Of the remaining
[563] households, 13 are Azerbaijani, two are Russian, and one is a Kazakh
who came to this kolkhoz from the Middle Horde in 1942 as a blacksmith.
The head of one of the Russian families is a carpenter, the other a
kolkhoz leader.[1]

This collective farm in the south appears in striking contrast to
those in the north, in the farming zone of the Semipalatinsk region, for
example, where Kazakh clan and lineage affiliations are mixed and
confused. The Kazakhs of southeast Kazakhstan know their horde and
clan affiliations; they are all of the Great Horde, and of one of four clans.
Korbe compiled a list of 11 collective farms in this area in which the
core population consisted of members of a specific lineage of a specific
clan. It thus seems clear that in this part of Kazakhstan the anvil upon
which the collective farm pattern was hammered out was the descent
group and the kin village. Here, then, is a Kazakh institution which
served as a means of accommodation to the Soviet pattern.[2]

The kin village and lineage were the channels through which the
Kazakh herdsmen passed into the collective farm life. That the passage
was made indicates the force which these institutions have even today.

621 The traditional function of the nomadic village was to organize the
annual movements of the member families as a collective enterprise

[1] Korbe, 1950, p. 71.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

under the direction of the village leader. The leader and the elders 621
decided all questions concerning village activities. The administration [622]
of justice was in the hands of the elders, while the enforcement of
decisions was a common village enterprise; thus the village peace was
kept. The raw framework of the village collectivity moved as a unit
into the Soviet era.

The Kazakh lineage supplied the basis for the practice of marrying 582
outside the group. The lineage occupied a common territory, and during 613
the course of the past century the unit of common residence rather than
the unit of descent and kinship has served to regulate marriage. Wives
are sought outside the village; girls leave their native villages to join
their husband's people, although this may not involve moving a great
distance. The lineage is today generally identical with the village, and [621]
under the Soviet regime, with the collective farm. There is today the [474]
practice of kolkhoz exogamy.[1]

The practice of polygamy has likewise proved compatible with 595
Soviet conditions. In former times, the many-wived family was the
family of the well-born, the rich, the influential; today, the many-wived [622]
family is that of the village leader, the kolkhoz president, the brigade
foreman. The leviratic marriage of the widow to the brother of the 596
deceased or to another close kinsman has also accommodated itself to [587]
Soviet conditions, within the framework of the extended family, for
among the peoples of the steppe this practice depends upon and reinforces
the extended family structure. In Kazakhstan, the extended family rests
on the close integration of several fraternal households and the conjugal
families of a father and his sons and at times even grandsons.

The Soviet ideological campaign has directed attention to the prac- 595
tice of polygamy among leading elements in Kazakh collective farms;
similarly, a number of reports indicate that leviratic marriage is still [587]
practiced. Soviet ethnographers do not discuss these institutions from
the standpoint of the functions of the Kazakh extended family and the
Kazakh village community. Instead, they have made a political issue
out of what they are pleased to call the survival of the feudal mores.
But they choose to ignore the fact that the practices which they condemn
are part and parcel of the existing family and village system.

The status of women in Kazakhstan is a serious question to Soviet 665
ideologists. In 1944, in 1949, and again in 1951, the Kazakh Party
leadership was briefed by the Central Committee in Moscow regarding
the participation of Kazakhs, of Kazakh women, and of literate and
educated people in the Kazakh Communist Party (see Chapter 6, which
deals with the Party). That the program has evidently fallen short of
plan is suggested by the repetition of the instructions. The Kazakhs
are not coming forward for training in Party work, despite the fact that
they are periodically encouraged to do so, and despite the prestige and
material advantages of Party membership. And the women lag behind
the men in this respect.

Woman's position in Kazakh society, and the Soviet failure to under- 177
stand the background of this position, has important consequences in the

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[1] Ibid., p. 86.

Kazakhstan RQ1

K 177 life of the republic. There is reason to doubt the population picture
provided by Soviet figures. Since polygamy is illegal in the Soviet Union,
polygamous marriages are carefully concealed from the Soviet registry.
A recent ethnographic report notes that registration of marriage is far
from general among the Kazakhs. There are cases in which birth
registration has been delayed in order to register children by one wife
in the name of another—another Kazakh device designed to circumvent
the prohibition of polygamy. Similarly, practices such as leviratic
marriage are maintained, concealed as much as possible from the
K Soviet authorities.[1]

114 The source for these data is a series of reports published in the
past five years by the Soviet ethnographer, O.A. Korbe. He and his
177 staff have advanced the thesis that Kazakh society in the Soviet period
includes a number of institutions which have survived from pre-Soviet
K days. A rebuttal has been entered by another Soviet ethnographer, a
[815] Kazakh, Sabitov. Basing his report on field work in the summer of 1952,
Sabitov seeks to show that rural Kazakhs have been transformed entirely
by the process of Sovietization. His conclusions are supported by a
certain amount of illustrative material; for example, he asserts that
kolkhoz houses show Russian influence and that Russian craftsmen are
employed for making stoves. Utensils used in daily life are for the
most part contemporary in both design and production. Clothing, on
the other hand, is in part traditional, in part modern.[2]

Sabitov's data are highly selective, for they concern only material
culture—housing, dress, utensils. He merely states, without specific
supporting data, that there have been changes in the social relations,
the spiritual culture, and other aspects of Kazakh society. That there
have been changes is obvious. Korbe stresses the traditional, the
"survivals"; Sabitov stresses the new elements. Neither has examined
K the interrelations of Kazakh culture and society with the Russian.

Little information is available on Kazakhs living in cities. Those
369 Kazakhs who have moved into urban areas apparently show little external
difference from their Russian neighbors. They live in houses of similar
KN architecture; photographs of KSSR cities reveal a uniform type of architecture
[341] among the apartment houses and public buildings which is an
amalgam of Central Asiatic and Russian designs. Plans for feeding the
K cities of Kazakhstan recognize no cultural differences (see Chapter 5
[262] on Economy). The Russian food pattern predominates: potatoes, vegetables,
meat, and milk products. Kazakh dietary customs exclude pork,
KN which is a typical Russian food carried by the Russians into Central
[369] Asia. One infers that segregation according to cultural background
exists at least to a certain degree in the cities. The separation of
Kazakhs from Russians is clearly not a public policy, nor is it a folk
K practice. The best explanation appears to be that the Kazakhs prefer to
[186] keep to themselves, and the Russians likewise.

K This attitude of holding off is shown in the intermarriage pattern,
177 or rather in the absence of one. The evidence is sparse, far from
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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

[2] Sabitov, 1953, pp. 97-99.

systematic, and subject to a number of qualifications. What data there are, however, suggest that among the people of Kazakhstan Russians marry Russians and Turks marry Turks. Again it appears that the Kazakhs do not wish to mingle with the Russians, just as, in the political domain, they do not join the Party nor engage in other political activities with the Russians. In general, on the basis of what direct evidence there is, this attitude may be summed up as noncompliance, or a kind of passive resistance. Corroborative data are seen in the economic domain, where the Kazakhs are not fulfilling plans. 177 186 668

THE SOVIET THEORY OF CULTURAL CHANGE

The theory of acculturation in anthropology has been devised to describe the social process which occurs when two different cultures come into close contact with each other. This theory has arisen out of the reflections of western European and American ethnologists on contact between their own culture and others. But there is in western civilization no general theory of culture which deals with total control of the social relations and direction of change resulting from such contact. The Russian policy toward minorities within the Soviet Union is nothing other than a theory of controlled acculturation. In their theory of history and in the formulation of their minority policy the Soviet theoreticians have proclaimed a method whereby they—and they alone—are able to control the processes of social development. They boast control over the direction in which the different peoples of the Soviet Union will change; they claim the power to dictate the manner of the change and the form that the ultimate society will take. 177 [121]

Starting out as a society of pastoral nomads in which membership was based on paternal kinship traced from a common male ancestor (a society also divided into aristocrats and commoners), the Kazakhs joined—or rather, were drafted into—the Soviet world. The Soviet ethnographers depict the Kazakh society as an amalgam of institutions surviving from the past, coupled with Soviet features such as collective farm organization, Party membership, and government by soviets. The survivals include the family as the unit of production and consumption, and the traditional village organization, upon which the collective farm has been superimposed. Another survival is nepotism, which is ever present in Kazakh political life. A society steeped in traditions of kinship thinks of kinship as the means for social cooperation; hence, nepotism is inherent in the very nature of Kazakh society and inevitably finds its way into the political life. But it is incompatible with the Soviet pattern and it is attacked as such.

Soviet criticism of these features, and the constant drive to eradicate them, are essential elements in the theory of controlled social and cultural change. This change originating in the contact between the Russian and the Kazakh cultures becomes a part of the general pattern of controlled acculturation. This, however, is only the theory.

In reality there is little evidence that the grand plan for social change is being carried out, or even that there is a means for carrying

177 it out. The attempts by the Soviet regime to cause the Kazakhs to conform
to their plan are trial and error procedures which sometimes
succeed, sometimes fail. They work where the Kazakhs accept, they
fail where the Kazakhs are able to reject Soviet culture. Where the
Kazakhs accept, it is because they already possessed cultural institutions
similar to those which the Soviet regime wished them to have. The ease
with which the Kazakh family and village organization moved over into
the collective farm structure illustrates this. Both the traditional
Kazakh and the Soviet village and rural family are based on close internal
[621] cooperation; the core population of both the prerevolutionary and
the modern village are kinsmen.

Alternatively, the Kazakhs accept Soviet culture where their native
institutions have been crushed and the Soviet institution simply imposed
from above. An instance of this is the class structure and the government
[565] structure related to it. The Kazakh ruling class, the hereditary
nobility, was driven out, and the corresponding form of local government
collapsed. It was replaced by the present regime of Soviet functionaries
and the Soviet state structure within which they take their places. It
seems generally true that the small-scale institutions of the steppe
[182] peoples such as family and kinship are stabler, more constant than the
larger ones, such as state and empire.[*]

The Soviet culture has been rejected by the Kazakhs where no native
customs or institutions existed upon which the new pattern could be
[648] imposed. Thus the Soviet concept of a fraternity of nationalities combined
to form the USSR has no place in Kazakh life. The Kazakhs have
had no especially friendly relations with the Russians; on the contrary,
in the 19th century they hated the Russians as colonialists and frequently
rose in revolt against them. At present, relations have not improved;
the Kazakhs have no reason—political, economic, or cultural—to accept
the Russian regime more closely now than they did in the past. If one
finds no evidence today of revolts in Central Asia, it is because Soviet
control over the Kazakhs is far more efficient than that of the Tsars.
And if there were revolts or other expressions of mass unrest, resentment,
feelings of injustice, and the like, word of them would not reach
the western world until the Soviet press chose to mention them.

The theory of controlled acculturation remains a theory, the western
formulation of Soviet policy. It is in contrast with the western approach,
[182] which does not conceive of culture in terms of a controlling plan.
Kazakh culture has been disrupted through incorporation into the Soviet
Union; there are gaps in the fabric of their society resulting from the
rapid acculturation. The traditional has not been entirely replaced by
the new. Two reasons may be adduced for this: resistance by the
Kazakhs, and faulty or inadequate planning by the Soviets. The
deficiencies in the planning have tended to increase the degree of
the resistance.

[*] Krader (77), 1953.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Chapter 4

RELIGION

THE MOSLEM RELIGION AND THE KAZAKHS

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The Turkic peoples of Central Asia—Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Kashgarian, Altai-Turk, Taranchi, and Sart—are divided by habitat and occupation regarding their religious practices and beliefs. The city-dwelling Turk and the farming Turk have been under Islamic influence for many centuries; the Turkic cities of Central Asia have been among the great centers of Islamic culture. The herdsmen of the Central Asiatic steppe, on the other hand, are Islamic only in circumscribed aspects of their religious life. There is an interplay between these two divisions, farmers and herders, which deserves careful treatment, for it is of especial significance today.

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No adequate survey of the religion of the Kazakhs has been made. This is unfortunate, for analysis of the various components of Kazakh religion is a complex task and one with profound significance to the purposes of psychological warfare and political understanding. There is a widespread belief among both scholars and laymen that the Kazakhs are Moslems, and should be treated accordingly. The roots of this belief lie in the past, along with certain errors regarding the language of the Kazakhs. About 80 years ago, the Russian Orientalist and political adviser V. Grigoriev, in an article entitled "Russian Policy in Asia," appended to Schuyler's Turkistan, wrote the following:[1]

> "We [Russians] imagined that the Kirghiz [Kazakhs] were the same ethnographically as our Volga Tartars, and therefore for one hundred and twenty years we carried on all our correspondence with them in the Tartar language in the full assurance that we were communicating with them in the native tongue which they fully understood while, in fact, it was exactly the same as writing to Spaniards in Italian. . . . Still worse results followed: another misunderstanding of ours was, that the Kirghiz were Mohammedans, whereas in the last [18th] century they were almost all Shamanists, and a large number of them remain so to this time. At the epoch of their nominal union with Russia only a very few of the Khans and Sultans had a confused idea of the dogmas of Islam and performed some few of its rites. Not a single mosque then existed in the Kirghiz Steppes, not a single mullah performed there the rites of the Mussulman religion, and if since that time the Kirghiz have really become Mussulman to a considerable degree, it is only owing to our taking them for Mussulmans, and to our treating them as such. As incontrovertible proof that the

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[1] Schuyler (110), Vol. 2, 1876, pp. 404-408.

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> Mussulman propaganda in one form or another went into the Kirghiz Steppes from the side of Russia is the circumstance that especially those Kirghiz who live along our lines have become Mussulman, while the old genuine Shamanism is kept up, even at the present time, among those Kirghiz particularly who wander in the neighborhood of Khiva, Bukhara, and what was formerly Khokand, that is, in really Mussulman country."

Grigoriev ascribed too much importance to the weight of Russian intermediation on behalf of Islam, and thus continued the same sort of error he was describing; the Russian authorities greatly overestimated the role of Islam among the Kazakhs, while Grigoriev overestimated the role of the Russians in bringing it to them. Study of the problem of acculturation has made anthropologists today less naive concerning a people's capacity to accept or reject a given element from another culture. However, Grigoriev is correct in recording the error involved in official Russian recognition of Islam as the religion of the Kazakhs. [171] This error is part of a still larger one, that of failing to understand the cultural diversity in Central Asia, a matter which is implied by the error in language mentioned by Grigoriev. The Kazakhs have a different language from the Tartars of European Russia, as well as a different religion, economy, and social organization.

Grigoriev, on the other hand, calls attention to an important distinction regarding the religion of the Kazakhs, or as he calls them, the [565] Kirghiz: Only the ruling strata of Kazakh society had any degree of contact with Islam in the 18th century, when the Russian conquest began. This fact is independently corroborated by A. Bennigsen, who has conducted research among the Kazakh displaced persons of World War II, now living in Paris. Bennigsen writes, "It is only among certain D.P.'s who are descendants of the families of 'feudal bais' that we have observed the survival of the Moslem faith."[7] Only in families of this social class has there been any sort of Moslem tradition or learning.

The Russian empire in the 18th and 19th centuries sought to use the religion of Islam as a bridge into the society and political life of the Kazakhs. A similar tactic has been used repeatedly by the Soviet regime. [538] The results have been negligible. In the words of a modern-day Kazakh poet and novelist, Sabit Mukanov:

> "For many historical reasons, the Kazakh masses took relatively poorly to the religious traditions [of Islam], and the Kazakh woman was not subjected to the yoke of the laws of the Shariat to the same degree that, for instance, the Uzbek women were. The Kazakh women were never veiled; they took part in festivals together with men."[8]

In addition to Mukanov's statement that the Kazakh woman was not put into the harem or otherwise sealed off from the world, as the Moslem [562] woman is supposed to be, other reports indicate that the nomadic woman is notably freer than the woman of the settled villages and cities of Central Asia. This is an important index to the degree of influence which Islam practices have had on the life of the Kazakhs.

[7] Personal communication.
[8] Mukanov, 1949, p. 5.

Mukanov offers another measure of the impact of Islam in his reference to the Shariat. 177 The Shariat is technically the canonical law of Islam. 114 Unlike the canonical law of western civilization, however, it governs the 779 entire life of the devout Moslem, not merely his relationship to his church. The Shariat governs, in theory, the daily habits of the Moslem, prescribes whom he may or may not marry, and sets forth the entire body of social relations and controls—between master and servant, man and woman, parent and child, ruler and governed. The fact that the very existence of this body of rules of conduct is little known among the nomadic Kazakhs is of great significance. Taken in combination with other less striking bits of evidence, it points to the superficiality of the Kazakhs' adoption of Islam. Although Moslem observance and practice is everywhere more formalized in urban than in rural surroundings, for the nomadic Kazakhs it is not merely less systematic; it is also less important.

KAZAKH FOLK RELIGIONS

At the end of the 19th century a Russian, Poiarkov, traveled among the Kazakhs in the northeast of their domain, in Semirechie in the territory [131] of the Great Horde. He learned that these Kazakhs had not seen a mullah, or Moslem cleric, until some 15 or 20 years before his travels. In the 1890's mullahs were still exceedingly rare among the Kazakhs who lived near the Chinese border. Few Kazakhs knew Moslem prayers, or if they did, only inaccurately; few knew the Koran.[1]

Because he did not overestimate the influence of Islam on the Kazakhs, Poiarkov was able to supply positive details of the religions of these people. [771] He distinguished between two layers, the remains of the old folk religion and an overlay of the new Islamic faith among the literate. The most important of the old beliefs or cults is that centered 769 around the soul of the deceased ancestor, arvak among the Kirgiz, aurak among the Kazakhs. These ancestors represent a strong force among their living descendants and are prayed to and invoked in time of need. The ancestor cult forms an integral part of the traditional social struc- [182] ture of the Kazakhs, built as it is around the genealogy and the preservation of the descent line. However, according to Poiarkov, the cult of ancestors was weakening under the impact of Islam on the one hand and [177] Russian acculturation on the other.[2]

The term shamanism is often mentioned in connection with the 756 Kazakhs. In this religion the leader, or shaman, is ecstatic, hysterical, [158] marked by abnormal behavior (not only according to the standards of western society, but also according to his own); he is considered to be possessed by and have control over the world of the spirits, and by enter- [787] ing into relations with them can use them to his own will. He cures illnesses, has powers of divination, can avert misfortune and the evil eye. For many centuries he has been far in advance of western medicine by recognizing psychosomatic disorders; he concentrates on them, and so

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[1] Poiarkov, 1891, pp. 21-22.
[2] Ibid., pp. 25-28.

756 avoids ailments which his power cannot cure, such as a broken leg. The
shaman generally sets himself into a state of trance, in which he projects
[779] his soul into the spirit realm and there discovers the secret cause of
some human disorder, cattle plague, or whatever problem faces him.
The Kazakh shaman, called bagsha, belongs to a hereditary profession.
The patrilineal organization of Kazakh society is reflected in this folk
religion: "The profession of bagsha is transmitted usually from father
to son; this inheritance pattern bears the name of bagshylyk."[1]

756 This form of shamanism is widespread among the Turks and the
171 Mongols, where the former have not been absorbed into the world of
Islam, or the latter into the world of Buddhism. Kazakh shamanism is
connected most intimately with the social organization of the people.
The practice of animal sacrifices conducted by the shaman in the case
[782] of severe or dangerous disease, the shaman's use of the drum or tambourine (Kazakh dabyl) in his ceremonies, the passing of a shaman's
spirits to his son when the shaman dies, are all part of the fabric of
Turko-Mongol religion and society, just as is the cult of ancestors. However, the Kazakhs have not lived in a vacuum sealed off from the Moslem
[177] world, for they have formed part of ancient empires thoroughly Islamic
in faith; the empire of Tamerlane, to which the ancestors of the Kazakhs
belonged in the 14th and 15th centuries, was a Moslem empire. The
bagsha's spirits are known among the Kazakhs as djinns, a Moslem term
for spirits; the bagsha frequently invokes Allah, and the Arabic devil,
Shaitan, is accursed and admonished.[2]

177 Elements of Islam have thus slipped into the folk religion of the
Kazakhs, a process over which the Russians have had no control; Tsarist
779 recognition of Islam was not needed to introduce these elements among
the Kazakhs.

For an exact appraisal of the role of Islam among the Kazakhs,
another ancient practice must be examined. The Kazakhs have traditionally believed in and made pilgrimages to holy places. In Central
[788] Asia one finds a vast number of such places, tombs of saints or of other
[778] holy men. These tombs, called mazar by the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, stand
alone or together with several others within an earthen enclosure which
forms a sacred ossuary.[3] Among devout Moslems visits to these places
can even replace the pilgrimage to Mecca.

177 In recent years the Soviet regime has been concerned about this
practice. The Party Committee of the Pavlodar Region in May 1952
called for strengthening of the natural sciences and of antireligious
propaganda, with special reference to a mazar in the Bayan-Aul
[778] District, which has existed for many years. The Academy of Sciences
of Kazakhstan was instructed to put an end to the legends regarding the
saint in the tomb. The Academy formed a committee to visit the sepulchre and examine the matter, but the committee limited itself to
inscribing certain remarks in the visitor's book beside the tomb. It
was denounced by the Party for its lack of effort.[4]

[1] Castagne (27), 1930, pp. 67-73.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 67-73.
[3] Castagne (29), 1951, pp. 46-50.
[4] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 24 May 52.

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EVALUATION OF ISLAM IN SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

The folk religion of the Kazakhs has formed a distinct block to the process of Sovietization. This does not mean that Islam among the Kazakhs is regarded as a key threat by the Soviet regime, but it can be said that the folk religion of the Kazakhs, including certain elements which that religion shares with Islam, is dangerous to the Soviets.

One may gain a clearer perspective by contrasting the situation regarding antireligious propaganda in Kazakhstan with that in Uzbekistan. Islam is singled out in the press of Soviet Uzbekistan as a central heresy. When Osman Yusupov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party, reported to the Party's 10th Congress, a large part of his report dealt with the problem of Islam among the Uzbeks. His statement concluded with a resolution to "battle against the Moslem religion."[1] A similar report given to the Fifth Kazakh Party Congress in 1951 by Shaiakhmetov, then first secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, made no mention of Islam as a danger in Soviet Kazakhstan.[2] At about the same time Shaiakhmetov, in a report on ideological work presented to the 88th Plenum of the Central Committee in Kazakhstan, devoted himself to the various deviations from the Party line—bourgeois nationalism, xenophobia, autonomism, idealization of the feudal past, and so forth. Again there was no mention of Islam.[3]

On the other hand the sedentary Turkic and Central Asiatic populations of Kazakhstan, such as the Uigurs and the Dungans, are repeatedly attacked for "Islamic survivals." The following attacks on religious heresies in Kazakhstan were printed in Kazakhstankaia Pravda in a little more than a year:

12 March 1952 – Article on the religious survivals (polygamy) in the Kurdai District, Dzhambul Region (a district inhabited by Dungans).

12 March 1952 – Critique of the religious mentality in South Kazakhstan Region.

14 March 1952 – Article on the religious survivals among the Dungans of Dzhambul Region.

25 March 1952 – Article denouncing the survival of the feudal mentality among the Komsomols (Young Communists) of Chimkent.

21 May 1952 – Account of the work of the Congress of Scientific Establishments convoked by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Kazakhstan, in Alma-Ata. This Congress denounced the survival of religious activity in the Kzyl-Orda and Pavlodar regions.

6 July 1952 – Article denouncing the survivals of such Islamic institutions as the harem and the sequestration of women among the Dungans of Kurdai District, Dzhambul Region.

19 September 1952 – Attack on the persistence of the Islamic tradition among the Dungans of the Kurdai District, Dzhambul Region.

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[1] *Kizil Uzbekistan*, 2 Mar 49.
[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Dec 51.
[3] *Ibid.*, 28 Oct 51.

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4 March 1952 – At the Sixth Congress of the Kazakh Komsomol, the regional committees of South Kazakhstan, Dzhambul, Kzyl-Orda, and Alma-Ata regions, were denounced for failing to combat inequalities in female education.

7 July 1953 – Article of similar tenor on the Kzyl-Orda Region.

2, 3, and 4 April 1953 – Komsomol Congress. Again survivals of traditional religion are denounced with reference to Kzyl-Orda, Dzhambul, and South Kazakhstan regions.

All the regions cited in which the religious issue has been raised lie in the southern part of Kazakhstan, with the exception of the one case noted for Pavlodar, in the north. The south is the zone of sedentary agricultural tradition, heavily Islamicized for many centuries. Moreover, in many regions of the south there is a large Uzbek population.

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Even if Grigoriev's account of the lack of Islamic influence in the southern part of the Kazakh steppe was true for his day, this situation no longer exists. Tsarist and Soviet policies have combined the Uzbeks with the Kazakhs for administrative purposes, and cultural interaction between these two peoples has increased in the past century. As a result, more of Islam has appeared among the Kazakhs in the south than in the center or the north, a reversal of the trend described by Grigoriev.

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The policy of political combination on an ever-increasing scale has also been applied to the Kazakhs in the religious domain. As a consequence, Kazakh representatives have appeared at official Soviet-Moslem congresses sponsored by Moscow, and they occupy a high place in the Moslem religious administration. The world of Islam within the USSR is divided into four regional administrations under the supreme presidency of the grand Mufti-al-Islam, whose seat is in Ufa, the capital of Soviet Bashkiria. The present incumbent is the Grand Mufti Abderrahman Rasulayev. The four regional administrations are:[1]

(1) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of the RSFSR, at Ufa, Bashkir ASSR.
(2) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, at Tashkent, Uzbek SSR.
(3) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of the North Caucasus, at Bunaisk, Dagestan ASSR.
(4) The Spiritual Directorate of the Shia Moslems and the Moslems of all Transcaucasia, at Baku, Azerbaijan SSR.

The second of the spiritual directorates listed governs the religious community of Islamic Central Asia; its territory comprises Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tadzkikistan. Its mufti, who ranks together with the three other regional Moslem chiefs directly under the Grand Mufti in Ufa, is Ishan Babakhan, and Uzbek; the second in command in Soviet Central Asia, directly under Mufti Ishan, is the Kadi Abdulgaffar Shemsuddinov, a Kazakh.[2]

The Moslem Administration of the Soviet Union has convoked a series of congresses whose timing is of great interest. A congress of all Islamic peoples of the Soviet Union was convened under the chairmanship of Grand Mufti Abderrahman Rasulayev in June 1942; it called upon the world of Islam to cooperate in the defeat of Nazism.[7] The most recent of the congresses was convoked in May 1952 to denounce American agression in Korea.[8] 648 779

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[1] Bennigsen (11), 1952, pp. 12-13.
[2] *L'Oriente Moderno* (87), 1949, p. 11; *Islamic Review* (69), April 1949, pp. 60-61.

The policy of expediency and opportunism which has motivated the Soviet manipulation of the Islamic peoples within its borders need not be discussed here. Activities of the Islamic hierarchy have been permitted and supported only when they have served the interests of the Soviet regime. Of greater significance is the error of hyperorganization into which the Soviet regime has fallen. It has in effect perpetuated the error of the Tsarist regime, exposed by Grigoriev, with regard to the Kazakhs and the Kirgiz. Congresses are convoked by rubber stamp to denounce that which Moscow denounces. And the membership and representation of these congresses are augmented by rubber stamp to lend the force of greater numbers to their resolutions. Thus age-old errors are carried forward into the second half of the 20th century. 177 648 779

In summary, then, the religion of the Kazakhs is an amalgam of aboriginal shamanism with certain borrowings from Islam among the folk cults. Since Islam in Central Asia is the religion of the sedentary farmers and the urban societies, the Kazakhs have not had very much direct contact with it, except perhaps for those among the ruling strata of Kazakh khans and sultans. Both the Tsarist and the Soviet regimes have mistakenly grouped the Kazakh nomads in the general category of Central Asiatic Moslems. Although this administrative policy may eventually result in the full incorporation of the Kazakhs into the Islamic world of Central Asia, such is far from the case today. The Pan-Islam movement, working toward the unification of all Islamic peoples, has had small visible effect on the Kazakhs. Interviews conducted in Paris, Munich, and Istanbul among Kazakh DP's point clearly to the lack of contact between the Kazakh herdsmen and Islamic influences in the 1940's. The Soviet regime sometimes adds the denunciation of "Pan-Islamicist" in the round of attack on a political heretic, but it does so by mechanical rote, drawing upon the general armament of the propagandist and the agitator. Rarely is a specific charge made against a Kazakh deviationist; never does the Kazakh press consider it necessary to root out the ideology of Pan-Islam among Kazakhs, although such is frequently the Soviet attitude toward other peoples of Soviet Central Asia. [771]

NATIVISM

Nativism, as a religious development among people who have felt the impact of western civilization, has begun to receive considerable attention in recent anthropological literature.[9] In many parts of the world, natives have reacted to contact with the western culture by rejecting it 121 668 choice of the figure Alash, the founding ancestor of Kazakhdom, reflects the general structure of Kazakh society. In reviving its cultural heritage, a society established on the principle of patrilineal descent and organized according to carefully traced genealogies naturally would seek to re-emphasize those genealogies and to glorify the founding ancestors, whether mythical, fictional, or actual. Mythical Alash was not, at least [173] not entirely, for he lived in the time of Tamerlane. It is not clear that he is the ancestor of all Kazakhs, or even of all Kazakhs of the "white-bone" or nobility. He is the founding ancestor of all Kazakhs by a convenient fiction, a fiction which includes the descent lines of the nobles, for only a few of the nobility can demonstrate an actual descent from Alash. Nevertheless, he counts as the ancestor of all, and as such he enters the shadowy domain of half-myth, half-history, which suits the temper of the present Kazakh traditionalism admirably.

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[7] Syria (83), 23 Jun 42; *L'Oriente Moderno* (87), 1942, p. 372.

[8] Bennigsen (11), 1952.

[9] One of the sharpest formulators and most extensive contributors to the theory was the late Ralph Linton.

Descent from a wolf and a doe is no longer an acceptable expression for one's lineage; the world of the steppe has become disenchanted. But [177] a great historical figure out of the past—distant enough and glorious enough—is a suitable expression of the Kazakh quest for social, political, and cultural unity. The emergence of Alash as a battle cry, the invoking of a distant ancestor in the formation of a modern party, is a Kazakh solution peculiarly their own. The concern of the Kazakh historians of the 1940's with similar figures, in this instance the leaders of resistance to the Russian conquest, emerges from the same cultural theme, with certain additions. The figures of the 19th century Kazakh rebels, Kenesary, Srym, Taimanov, and the others, are ancestors taken from the past. They are the ancestors of many descent lines whose living members are conscious of the relationship; they are symbols of an anti-Russian movement.

Chapter 5

ECONOMY

TRADITIONAL PATTERN OF KAZAKH ECONOMY

233 The traditional economy of the Kazakhs is herding, the raising of cattle, horses, camels, and, numerically the most important, sheep and goats. Settled life is despised, farming is despised. Herding is a nomadic way of life, but this does not mean indiscriminate wandering over the face of the earth. In the past, when all Kazakhs were nomads, [221] each herding community had its fixed pattern of grazing, starting in the spring from the winter quarters, traveling to pastures where they spent the summer, then returning over the same path to the winter quarters again. [221] Each community had its own territory for grazing and camping, and would fight off any intruder. Communities camped in closer proximity to each other—making for greater density of population—where there was more water and grass for the herds.[1]

233 197 The most favorable area for herding, with regard to the availability of plant cover and water, is in the northern part of the Kazakh steppe. Unfortunately, this part of the steppe is precisely the zone which is able to support a small amount of agriculture, and it was here that the Russians and Ukrainians settled in the 19th century. As a result the Kazakhs, in a period when their population was increasing, were thrust back on a more limited territory, away from the grassy steppe, away from the river and lake shores favored by the Slavs for agriculture, away from the water courses in northeastern Kazakhstan where mining, as well as agriculture, had been instituted. The steppe which remained to them was of poorer quality, for herding or for any other subsistence economy.

178 241 565 Faced with the problem of sustaining a herding economy with more of their number on less and poorer land, the Kazakhs began to take up agriculture. The first to go over to the new way were the poor, the marginal herders. The rich, of course, continued their pastoralism, hiring the poor to work for them. Out of this emerged a new pattern of mixed herding and farming. During the latter part of the 19th century, crops were planted at the winter quarters, and tended by the poor Kazakhs and by women, while the wealthier able-bodied men went off with the herds in the more honored occupation.

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[1] For a detailed description of the Kazakh nomadic pattern, see Rudenko in Baranov, 1927.

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The farming which the Kazakhs now employ was not the typical Central Asiatic Turkic farming, with intensive soil exploitation by artificial irrigation; it was the farming brought to them from Eastern Europe by the Russians and the Tatars (Turks of European Russia). The crops, chiefly grains, and the implements were European.[1]

The Soviets have sought to settle the native populations, and have devised grandiose schemes to transform the steppe desert, such as the Bet-Pak-Dala, into fertile paradises. They have failed to settle the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, and to increase the area under cultivation, despite the perspectives originally held out in the 1930's.[2] They have failed to turn the deserts into ploughlands, despite their plans. The plan to transform the Bet-Pak-Dala has been abandoned, at least temporarily, and the region has been permitted to return to the herding economy.[3] One factor in these reversals is the economic orientation of the Kazakhs, to whom agriculture is a lowly pursuit.

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Such then is the subsistence pattern which the Kazakhs brought with them into the Soviet period. This period begins not with the year 1917 but more accurately in 1928; the intervening decade was an era of transition, to some extent of laissez faire, in which the Kazakhs were left to their own devices. The transitional period came to an abrupt end with the beginning of forced collectivization.

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN THE SOVIET PERIOD

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The labor force of Kazakhstan is divided into three broad categories, agriculture, herding, and industry.

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In agriculture, the grain crops are raised by all nationalities of the republic. Russians and Ukrainians in the north and northeast grow cereals along rivers and lakes within the black-earth area of agriculture; rice is grown by Uzbeks in the south, and by Uigurs and Dungans close to the Chinese border in the east. Kazakhs raise grains for human consumption as well as for livestock feed in the central areas, sandwiched in between the Slavs to the north and the Uzbeks to the south. The Russians and Ukrainians raise a certain amount of livestock feed for their draft horses and milk cows. The potato and vegetable farming is done largely by Slavs in the vicinities of the larger cities, such as Karaganda, Alma-Ata, and Balkhash-Kounradskiy. Cotton and other nonsubsistence crops are raised largely by Uzbeks who live in the southern districts, and by Uigurs in the Ili River valley.

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Pastoralism is the virtual monoploy of Kazakhs. That they were herders in the past has already been established; more significant for the present is the fact that the areas of highest pastoral productivity in Kazakhstan are also the areas in which the Kazakhs represent the highest proportion of the population. The region of Guryev, for example, is one of the three leading pastoral regions of the republic: its population

[1] Kaufman, 1908, passim.
[2] Sakharov, 1934.
[3] Beradin, 1946.

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The figures for the number of sheep are particularly significant, since this animal is of central importance to the nomad. Mutton is virtually the nomad's only meat; sheep milk is used as much as cow or mare milk. The sheep herds did not recover from the losses of the early 1930's as well as the cattle; by 1949, the number of sheep was 15,000,000, or approximately 68 per cent of the 1929 peak. In 1953, according to a statement made by Khrushchev,[1] secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the number of sheep and goats was significantly less than it had been in 1928, the index year for current Soviet statistics on Kazakh livestock. In 1928, the number of sheep and goats had been 20,500,000, with a ratio of four sheep to one goat; hence there were approximately 16,000,000 sheep. It would appear, then, that the number of sheep has not increased since 1949; it may possibly have decreased.

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The figures reported for the number of hogs in Kazakhstan provide a useful index of the degree to which Slavic farmers (Russian and Ukrainian) have moved into the republic. The pig is of European origin; it is not native to rural Turkestan and was introduced there only recently. There were 300,000 hogs in Kazakhstan in 1924 and 1929, 500,000 in 1927, and 370,000 in 1938—the only category in which a figure for the 1930's exceeds any of those for the previous decade. Kazakhs have never eaten pork, partly on religious grounds—it is taboo for Moslems—and partly on traditional grounds. The present-day importance of pork in the KSSR economy is shown by the fact that in 1953 it constituted 53 per cent of the total meat production of the republic.[2]

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COLLECTIVIZATION

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Of fundamental importance in understanding the Kazakh attitudes toward Sovietization is the impact which collectivization during the late twenties and early thirties had upon these attitudes. During the drive to collectivize the Kazakhs, thousands of families were handed over to the GPU, hundreds of thousands of families starved to death, and further thousands sought to escape the consequences of being identified as Kazakhs by emigrating or declaring themselves to be Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, or other neighboring peoples. (See Chapter 2.)

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During the period of collectivization, the Party leader of the Kazakh republic, F. I. Goloshchekin, made a number of remarkably frank statements. In a series of articles and speeches prepared between 1928 and 1930, he described how collectivization was accomplished. In November 1928, he stated that 657 households were confiscated, and a total of 143,000 cattle units (whereby five sheep equals one head of cattle) were collectivized.[3] In an article two years later he said that a group of 696 households had been confiscated.[4] Another source reveals that some 700 Kazakh households were confiscated in 1929.[5]

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[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 23 Oct 53.

[2] *Ibid.*, 21 Oct 53.

[3] Goloshchekin, 1931, p. 201.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 208.

[5] Kuchkin, 1946.

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The collectivization drive in the 1928-1930 period did not simply confiscate Kazakh households at the rate of 700 a year. In yet another article written during the same period, Goloshchekin summarized the methods used: "Now referring to some of the results of the confiscation, let us look at the methods we used to resolve the question. No doubt the decree [in reconfiscation] was effective here, administrative organs were effective, especially the GPU."[1] If the average per household was no more than five persons, which is a low estimate, there is direct evidence for concluding that in these three years the fates of 10,000 to 12,000 Kazakhs were placed in the hands of the GPU.

Direct evidence stops at this point. One may infer that these people were lost to the Kazakhs, that even if they were not liquidated, they disappeared in the GPU system. One must bear in mind that these are cases which entered into the official record; it is known that a large proportion of cases turned over to the GPU did not become a matter of record. With the year 1930, the era of frankness came to an end. GPU methods intensified, and the period of the mass purge trials began. Trends which had begun in Kazakh family economy now accelerated until the number of livestock began to fall, between 1929 and 1933. The first reports of confiscations and liquidations are given for 1928; the number of livestock fell by three to five million, or about 10 per cent, from the 38,000,000 reported in 1927. In the spring of 1929 there was a recovery to 40,000,000 head of livestock, but from that point the decline was unbroken, to 33,000,000 in 1930, down to 5,000,000 in 1933.

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Thus the second phase of the drive to collectivization was immeasurably worse in its human consequences than the initial phase. The first phase was relatively mild, with the arrest of only a few thousand families. The second phase involved an ever-widening circle of resistance to collectivization by the Kazakhs, punishment by the GPU, increased resistance by the Kazakhs, increased activity by the GPU. This struggle is reflected in the livestock picture, for the Kazakhs continued to care for their stock, even in the face of the mass arrests. With increased terror came increased resistance, as the livestock decline reveals. One can safely estimate that liquidations by the GPU during the second phase were many times those of the first phase, which involved 10,000 to 12,000 Kazakhs at the very least.

This period of mass collectivization was accompanied by the elaboration of what Naum Jasny has called "bacchanalian planning," one of the projects being the fertilization of that cruel steppe desert, the Bet-Pak-Dala. In the following decade, the error of investing in agriculture in the Bet-Pak-Dala was finally seen, and its return to use as a marginal herding zone was recommended.[2] The Soviet ecologists and planners had been overly influenced by the number of natural wells and springs in the Bet-Pak-Dala, calculating their utility to agriculture without reference to the water table or to the poverty of the soil in organic matter. The significance of this error during collectivization was that Kazakhs were settled down precisely in these and other such experimental areas.

[311]

[1] Goloshchekin, 1931, p. 206.
[2] Borodin 1946, pp. 116-125.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

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The Kazakhs were collectivized more slowly than the Slavs. By 1930, the Pavlodar region, a Slavic farming area since the 19th century, was 76 per cent collectivized while the Guryev region, a Kazakh pastoral region, was only 44 per cent collectivized.[1] Progress on collectivization was slow both because Kazakh herders were among the strongest resisters to collectivization, and because their nomadic existance made the administrative problems in collectivizing them more difficult than for sedentary peoples.

Another indication of the severity of the impact of collectivization on the Kazakhs is seen in the rate of recovery. During the period including World War I, the Revolution, and the civil war, the Kazakhs suffered a number of heavy blows. They had their own revolution in 1916, which resulted in severe reprisals by the Tsarist enforcement agencies, and during 1917-1922 they suffered losses again. But during the 1920's they recovered to a point where the stock total exceeded that of 1917. Such was not the case in the period following collectivization, however; in 1953 the entire herding economy of Kazakhstan had not reached the position which it had attained in any one of the years in the 1927-1930 period. The Kazakhs in the 1920's demonstrated a resiliency and capacity to meet and overcome disasters, a capacity which is part of their *very history as herders. Herding is an economy which has few shock* absorbers; herders may easily be wiped out by a drought, a blizzard, or disease among their animals. Farmers have an ability to store against future need which the herders do not.

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[131]

The Kazakhs showed this resiliency during the first years of the Soviet era, in recovering from the civil war. But they have not recovered, even after 25 years, from collectivization. This loss of capacity to recover in the face of disasters is one indication of the collapse of the traditional Kazakh economy, and is related to a breakdown in the traditional form of the Kazakh society and culture.

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE RURAL ECONOMY

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In 1952 and 1953, the leadership of the Kazakh Communist Party and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made a series of statements indicating the grave situation in farming and herding in the republic.

It has already been stated that of three million hectares of land under irrigation, only 1,300,000 hectares, or 43 per cent, were actually in use. Afonov, until recently the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, attacked this situation in 1953 as a gross waste of resources.[2] In 1952, the same general criticism had been made in a somewhat different form. The then secretary of the Central Committee, and boss of the Kazakh Party, Shaiakhmetov, attacked the farmers of the southern regions of Kazakhstan, the Uzbeks, Taranchis, Dungans, and others, in Alma-Ata, Taldy-Kurgan, and Dzhambul, the leading agricultural regions of the republic. The principal charge

[1] Goloshchekin, 1931, p. 211.

[2] Afonov, *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 8 Oct 53.

8;Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 . RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

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The situation in herding is similar. The leading pastoral regions are in the western parts of Kazakhstan, the Guryev, West Kazakhstan, and Aktyubinsk regions. There has been a steady decline in cattle, sheep, and goats in the Guryev region from 1946 to 1953, which means that Kazakh herding in this region has not participated in the postwar recovery (Kazakhs form over two-thirds of the population of the Guryev region). A similar decline in cattle has been reported for West Kazakhstan and South Kazakhstan. In the regions of East and North Kazakhstan, cattle and sheep are below the prewar figures. Throughout the republic the ratio of cows to the total number of cattle in the kolkhoz herds is disproportionately low (24.3 per cent) and is falling; for instance, in the year 1952 the number of cows dropped by 10.8 per cent. Cattle have been falling in number from year to year in both collective and state farms.[1]

The milk yield per kolkhoz was lower in 1952 than in 1940.[2] This statement is an even graver admission than it seems at first glance, because the individual collective farm is larger in 1952 than it was in 1940 and there are fewer kolkhozy now than then.

In the same period, 1940-1952, the average milk yield per cow dropped 76 liters.[3] The average annual milk yield per cow for 1939 was 650 liters[4]; if it can be assumed that there was little change between 1939 and 1940, a fall of 13 per cent in milk production per cow is indicated for the 1940-1952 period.

Milk production is closely associated with the statistics of gravidity, and there has been a considerable decline in this category in Kazakhstan as well. In 1948, out of 100 cows 88 were with calf, while only 74 out of every 100 were with calf in 1951. Similarly, of every 100 mares, 78 were with foal in 1948; this figure had dropped to 67 in 1951.[5]

The area sown in livestock feed had fallen in 1952 below the prewar (1940) level; this reduction led to the critical situation regarding milk production, and that of meat and wool as well. Despite the tremendous gain in pork, total meat production fulfilled only 60 per cent of plan. The same ratio of 60 per cent holds for wool and cotton.[6] The situation regarding wool is particularly bad; the wool yield per sheep has fallen off even more sharply than the milk yield per cow. In the period 1940-1952 the annual wool yield per sheep fell from 2.4 to 1.9 kilograms, or 4.2 pounds, an over-all drop of 21 per cent.[7]

K 369 177

On the one hand, the Kazakhs do not cooperate in the Soviet pattern of production; on the other, the Soviet emphases are such as to exclude the Kazakhs. For example, the stress on such alien foods as pork, potatoes, and garden vegetables, in the development of the urban pattern, means that as the Kazakh moves to the city he must give up many of his old food habits. And yet only in the city can one find higher learning.

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[1] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.
[2] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.
[3] *Ibid.*, 14 Nov 53.
[4] *Ibid.*, 4 Oct 52.
[5] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep 52.
[6] *Ibid.*, 14 Nov 53.
[7] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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K 369 177 K [182]

the only means by which, in the present context, the literary, artistic, and scientific expressions of Kazakh culture can develop. Kazakh economic life and material culture today are best described as reflecting a certain dispiritedness. This dispirited attitude underlies the apathy which allows skilled herdsmen to let their herds fall apart—failing to ensure that cows continue to calve, neglecting to shear their sheep, not bringing mares to foal.

K 177 K [28] [171]

These various facts bespeak an unwillingness on the Kazakhs' part to participate in the Soviet life as well as a holding-off policy by Moscow. In the field of native handicrafts a similar situation prevails. Kazakh craftsmen had until recently a degree of skill in rugmaking and feltmaking (largely a woman's occupation), leatherwork, and certain metal crafts such as brassworking. These crafts they shared with other Central Asiatic peoples, both Turkic and Iranian. This has all disappeared. The Kazakhs have lost contact with their own culture; they have been forbidden to express interest in their own past.

K [648]

The Kazakhs recovered splendidly from the losses of World War I and the Revolution, rebuilding their herding strength in the next decade. During this period they were left more or less alone by Moscow. During 1929-1933 the Kazakhs again suffered tremendous losses. In the ensuing period they were not left alone, and they have not recovered, even after 25 years. Never in the history of Soviet Kazakhstan has a plan for herding been fulfilled. In 1952 a partial exception did occur—the plan for horses was fulfilled—but only, according to Shaiakhmetov, through huge investments by the state.[4]

INDUSTRY

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The industrial development of Kazakhstan has proceeded along the line of extraction of natural resources, primarily metals and fuels (see Figure 2). The metal extraction has a history which precedes the Revolution, and is almost exclusively in the field of nonferrous metals; to this day there is very little iron mining and ferrous industry in Kazakhstan.

KN [135]

The chief nonferrous metals are lead and zinc, mined in the Altai Mountains and near Taldy-Kurgan; copper, mined north of Lake Balkhash, in the vicinity of Dzhezkazgan, and between Akmolinsk and Pavlodar; and various deposits of manganese, bauxite, nickel, gold, phosphorus, chromite, and mineral salts. Iron is mined near the Sary-Su and at Kustanay.

Kazakhstan has both solid and liquid fuel resources. Large deposits of coal are scattered throughout the central and northern parts of the republic, from the Mangyshlak peninsula in the west to the Chinese border in the east; the most important, ranking third in the Soviet Union, is that at Karaganda. Lignite is found in the extreme south, at Lenger and Chimkent, but in small amounts relative to the solid fuels in the republic. Oil is found along the Caspian shore near the port of Guryev, and in the steppe between the Emba and Ural rivers.[5]

[4] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep 53.

[5] Pal'gov, 1953, pp. 126-135.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

the uneven commodity flow creates an unbalanced economy. The Kazakh republic is far from becoming economically self-sufficient. Fourth, the key to understanding the industrial picture in the KSSR is the total economic dependence of the Kazakhs on Russia for all consumer commodities. These include clothing, processed foods, furniture, and all electrical and electronic commodities, such as light bulbs and radios; motor supplies, automobiles, and the gas and lubricants necessary to run them; stoves and all other heating devices for using the coal and lignite the Kazakhs themselves produce.

KN 433 439

A good example is afforded by the chemical industry. Kazakhstan has long been known for its riches in salts and other chemicals. In the 19th century, shortly after the annexation of the territory by Russia, a small-scale chemical plant was established at Chimkent. To this day, this remains the sole chemical-pharmaceutical plant in the entire republic, although it has been expanded under the Soviets. The bulk of the chemicals are extracted as raw materials, shipped elsewhere for processing, and only then made available to Kazakhstan, within the framework of the general pattern for distribution of these materials.

KN [381]

Finally, it is clear that this economic dependence on Russia serves to reinforce Moscow's political control over the peoples of Kazakhstan.

KN [648]

The problem of manpower and the training of labor is central here. The industry of Kazakhstan, aside from the prerevolutionary mining centers, was established by means of forced labor camps at Karaganda, which during the 1930's was an NKVD area, and by the transfer of workers from Leningrad in the same period; during the war, workers from Moscow, Leningrad, and the Donbass were brought in for work in industry and mining. The Kazakhs have not participated in this industrial development. Very few industries requiring skilled labor have been established in Kazakhstan, and those few are based on a labor force derived from Russia and the Ukraine. The Kazakhs are not being introduced to the techniques which Russians are learning to master in the process of their industrial growth. The industrial picture confirms the conclusion drawn from the examination of the social and political scenes: The native Kazakhs are being encouraged by the Soviets to enter into industry, but they are not coming forward to be trained; they are holding back from participation in Soviet life.

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K [463]

K [177] [668]

Kunaev, 1949.

Baisak (6), 1949.

Chapter V

CULTURAL AFFAIRS: THE POLITICS OF "CULTURE" AND EDUCATION

SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY

Much has been written on the subject of Soviet nationality policy; one calls to mind the ironic promise of full national self-determination asserted by Lenin and by Stalin. In keeping with this, the grandiose, term "union republic" is applied to Kazakhstan and other divisions of the Soviet Union. Lesser areas, such as the Karakalpak region, are called autonomous republics. The lower the political unit in the Soviet hierarchy, the greater the Soviet insistence on this facade of independence and autonomy.

Soviet doctrine states that nationalism is only a formal concern, not a contentual nor substantive one. On the contrary, they say, the substance and reality of Soviet culture is socialism, however much the doctrine of nationalism is preached. "Nationalist in form, socialist in content" is a formula once frequently cited to characterize Soviet nationality policy.

From an anthropological point of view, the Soviet nationality policy is a problem of contact between cultures, or acculturation. But it is based on a special sort of cultural impact. In most of the world, cultures or civilizations have been in continuing contact with one another; the Russian contact with the peoples of Siberia and Central Asia from the 17th century to 1917 was typical in many ways. But the present Soviet pattern is like none of the others. In the past the impact of western civilization on the rest of the world occurred with no thought to the eventual outcome of the impact. The Soviets, on the contrary, have a definite plan. The leaders have determined the path along which the minor peoples must develop toward Sovietization, and they have fixed the image of the final goal. This is controlled acculturation.

Whether the goal will be achieved is questionable; too little is yet known by social scientists about the total nature of culture, and the problems involved in changing the relation of a part to the whole, to permit the effective and predictable realization of such minutely planned change. In the Soviet Union such problems have not been explored at all, if one may judge by the anthropological literature of the USSR.

Thus the professed aims of Sovietization exist only on paper; they have little more value than other items of political propaganda. But one cannot escape the fact that the various societies and peoples of the Soviet Union are being reshaped and remolded with the image of Soviet culture as the target. The political life is that of Moscow's creation, as is the economic; the religious is that which is permitted by the central regime. The language of each nationality—as it is taught in the schools, or written in the newspapers—is the one which Moscow has decided upon. The various nationalities themselves have been regrouped, often arbitrarily, for the purpose of greater convenience of administration by Moscow. 177

The grandiose and sweeping nature of the changes planned under Soviet nationality policy is sufficient to assure that major change is in fact taking place. A question exists only in regard to the direction such change will take and how far it will deviate from the plan. Whatever the direction of change, the cost in dislocation and suffering among the minority peoples will remain enormous.

KAZAKH ART AND LETTERS

In the chapter dealing with Kazakh religion and religious developments, a discussion of current trends in history writing in Central Asia was included to illustrate the rise of nativism, the idealization of native culture. While the connection between historiography and religion is not immediately apparent, there is an underlying relationship. This relationship may be more easily traced when one is applying the methods of cultural anthropology, as was the case in the discussion of religion. If one starts with the premise that the various aspects of a people's life are an interrelated whole, it follows that the religious life bears upon the economic, the economic on the religious, the political on the artistic. The concept of nativism has been used as a means of synthesizing the different cultural trends in Kazakhstan. The significance of the glorification of their past by native Kazakh historians during the Soviet era is clear. The historical traditions of the Kazakhs are important to them; around those traditions they were building in the 1940's the nucleus of an independent revival of Kazakh culture. The Soviets regarded this as dangerous, and the participants were either purged or warned away from the theme. 668 [814]

This sort of cultural revival is a type of nativism known in many parts of the world; the common feature such revivals share is a distinctive religious tone. But it is not the old religion which is being revived among the Kazakhs; rather, the old traditions are being treated in a religious fashion. These traditions become a religion, and the renewed interest in them a religious revival. The movement among the Kazakhs to revive the traditions of the past immediately became involved in politics. The Russian term kultura usually implies such political ramifications. In this sense there is a cultural politics in the Soviet Union.

The cultural taste of the regime in Moscow serves as a model for the rest of the empire. This cultural taste includes in part that which is pleasing to the political leaders of the Soviet Union. It includes 53 177

53 also what Moscow deems proper to see developing in the provinces. 177 The architecture which is encouraged in Moscow is only part of the [341] climate of cultural taste. Public buildings in Alma-Ata reflect both Russian 19th century Baroque and Central Asiatic architectural themes: Russian columns and massiveness, Central Asiatic arches and blue tile ornament. Soviet architects have taken basic ideas from Russian contemporary architecture and to them added local ideas. Whether these hybrids are suited to local conditions of weather, availability of materials, and so forth, is another matter.

"Nationalist in form, socialist in content" was a much-publicized slogan 20 years ago; but it is seldom mentioned today. One can easily discuss Soviet art or architecture without reference to this formula; it no longer has even a covert role to play. The modern slogan might read "Soviet in basic form, local style in ornament."

668 This trend is evident in other forms of expression as well. Let us consider the topic of heroes. In the historical tradition, the Kazakh revival was centered around heroes of the past such as Kenesary Kasymov. This is not in keeping with the sense of heroism which the Kremlin seeks to instill in the Kazakhs. During the 1920's and 1930's, Moscow permitted only such heroes as Frunze and Chapayev, who fought the civil war in the steppes of Central Asia. To these has been added the figure of Amangeldy, a Kazakh who was an early member of the Bolshevik party. The revival of 19th century Kazakh heroes in the 1940's took place under conditions of wartime desperation. Moscow was anxious to sound any note that might awaken the feelings of the Kazakhs, to let any theme be pursued. The Soviets sought to show that the Russian revolutionaries in fighting the Tsars had advanced the same cause as had Kenesary, and that the Kazakhs and the Bolsheviks should therefore make common cause.

During World War II the possible selection of heroes expanded to include not only military and political leaders of the past, but literary [538] and scientific figures as well. Abai Kunanbaev, a 19th century Kazakh poet, has been much publicized in novels, plays, movies, and literary essays. He is acceptable to the Russians, for he was the translator into Kazakh of Russian poetry. Moreover, he was a friend of anti-Tsarist Russians, among them Chernyshevsky, a novelist and revolutionary exile. Chokan Valikhanov, although a Kazakh, was an officer of the Tsars, educated in St. Petersburg University, a member of [814] leading artistic and intellectual circles, and author of historical and ethnographic notes on the Kazakh past. He has been no less honored than Abai or Kenesary. Altynsarin, perhaps the greatest Kazakh intellectual, an educator, publicist, editor, ethnographer, and creator of a Kazakh alphabet, was likewise given a pre-eminent place in the Kazakh revival.

In the 1940's a Kazakh literary and artistic journal *Adabiet zhane* [214] *Iskusstvo* ("Literature and Art") was started. *Adabiet* is a Kazakh word [538] meaning literature, *iskusstvo* a Russian word meaning art; the title thus expresses the mixed character of contemporary Kazakh arts and literature. It can hardly be said that the journal is a success. It has been attacked for deviations from the political line, as might have been expected. In addition to being ideologically weak, from Moscow's viewpoint, it has been criticized for appearing irregularly. And above all, thousands of copies are left unsold.[4] In a word, it does not suit the aims of the Soviet regime, nor does it satisfy the needs of the Kazakhs. 668 538 [214]

At the beginning of the revival, in the early 1940's, an attempt was made to purify the Kazakh language of Russianisms, or failing that, to apply Kazakh orthographic rules to borrowed Russian words. The leading Kazakh novelist, Mukhtar Auezov, wrote a novel on the life of Abai Kunanbaev, in which he attempted to adapt the spelling of Russian words to the Kazakh language. This adaptation is most important in poetry, because the stress or accent in Kazakh falls only on the last syllable, while in Russian, as in English, it may fall on any syllable. [194] Auezov was severely criticized for this "error" by a philologist who asserted that Abai himself retained Russian words in their original form when there was no Kazakh equivalent. Auezov admitted his errors and agreed to purge from his language Kazakh treatment of Russian words.[5] The whole controversy is specious, for Kazakh orthography had not been standardized in the 19th century, when Abai was [104] composing, and is not standardized today. Abai had no standard orthography to impose upon the Russian, and therefore retained the original. Auezov's Kazakhization of the Russian is not so much a scientific achievement as a cultural expression, an attempt to formulate a Kazakh spelling style as part of a literary program in the context of a revival of traditional Kazakh culture.

Auezov himself presided over one Kazakh attack on another expression of their culture. In an article, "Considerations on the Novel," Auezov criticized a novel by another Kazakh, Mustafin, for its lack of local dialect terms and colloquialisms, its failure to reflect the folklore and the speech of Kazakh village life. But then he added, "In Mustafin's novel, the new president of the collective farm . . . accomplishes miracles in ten months. All goes as though by the flash of a magic wand . . . One detects here the influence of outmoded traditions of folklore whose heroes easily and carelessly cross over seas of fire, find a way through impassable forests and fly across immeasurable spaces upon the magical bird Zemurg."[6] Auezov cannot have it both ways. He criticizes Mustafin for lack of contact with the people and then attacks him for coming under the influence of "outmoded" folklore traditions.

Soviet influence has been responsible for several changes in Kazakh 538 literature. The traditional Kazakh mode of literary expression was 197 poetry. The novel did not exist in Kazakhstan until the advent of the Russians. Today there are a number of novelists, such as Mukhtar Auezov and Sabit Mukanov. Both of them started out as poets, and only later adopted the novel as a literary form.

The aim of Soviet writing, in theory, is to achieve "socialist realism." There should be no romanticizing, no formalism or the quest of form for

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[4] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 30 Oct and 12 Nov 53.

[5] *Ibid.*, 3 Sep 52.

[6] Auezov (4), 1951.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

538 177 form's sake, and above all, no subjectivism or nonobjectivism, so characteristic of recent western European art. And literature is to pursue socialist realism, that is, the objective expression of Soviet themes. In a word, art in the service of the state. The themes of Kazakh novels are typical Soviet themes: industrialization, as in the novel Life and Death by Mustafin; youth and the Soviet innovator or new Soviet man, as in Abishev's Young Generation and Mustafin's Shiganak; the Sovietization of rural life, as in Mukanov's Syr Darya and Mustafin's Millionaire. Mustafin and Mukanov have been officially praised for depicting the educative force of collective labor.[1] And Mukanov, Auezov, and Mustafin have been jointly praised for achieving professional stature as novelists, disclosing "their fruitful instruction by the Russian and Soviet literary classics in the method of Socialist realism in Kazakh prose."[2]

But the best works are those which deal with the past, such as Auezov's fictional biography of Abai and Mukanov's memoirs of his own prerevolutionary days, "My Schooling." These have been condemned because they contain glorifications of the past; they insist that all was not wrong in those times. The heroes of the new novels see their personal happiness in the weal of the Soviet fatherland; they think not only of immediate issues, such as their own collective farms, but of Moscow, Stalin, Leningrad, the Volga, and Stalingrad. They celebrate the Volga, Mother River of Russia.[3] But artistically, the new novels are less satisfying.

Auezov's novels about Abai are rich in their description of the Kazakh landscape, rich in language, but they are criticized for glorifying the "feudal-patriarchal" life of the past; they exalt past leaders and overlook Abai's fight against Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism.[4]

During the war, the Kazakh film industry received a tremendous
546 lift when the Moscow studios moved to Alma-Ata. This growth was short-lived, however, for the studios were moved back to Moscow after the war. A Soviet controversy arose about one of the few films made in Alma-Ata, a film on the life of Chokan Valikhanov. While the idea of filming the life of this historic figure was praised in the Party press, the film itself was sharply criticized. The reasons given for the criticism are highly instructive: The film does not show the influence on Valikhanov of Russian revolutionaries; it idealizes Pan-Islamists of the 1860's and 1870's; it revives the ideals of the Alash-Orda (free nomads as of yore—no cities, no schools, no science); it praises Kenesary; it fails to show how Valikhanov's father supported the union of Kazakhstan with Russia; it distorts the latter's role by claiming that he sought to disaffect from Russia.[5]

53 177 Kazakh literature and art are not nationalist in form and socialist in content. In the design of public buildings, in the various fields of writing, in the making of films, the content is designated by Moscow.

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[1] Malinovskii, 1949, p. 43.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48
[4] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 6 Sep 53.
[5] *Ibid.*, 23 Oct 52.

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The form is also imposed by Moscow, whether it concerns the introduction of the novel form in literature or the imitation of the massive architectural style in public buildings. Only the ornament and embellishment are locally derived.

HISTORY

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The same lines of criticism which the Soviets have directed at Kazakh literature and art have been applied to the writing of Kazakh history. The revival of Kazakh historical traditions during World War II developed into a great movement involving many Kazakh historians and writers. In 1950, *Pravda* published an editorial denouncing the entire movement, choosing for its main target the luckless Bekmakhanov, for his history of the Kenesary movement.[1] The Kazakh Party and press were slow in following the line laid down in *Pravda*. Only after a four-month delay did *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* take up the attack, printing a policy statement from the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, which commented on the *Pravda* editorial of the previous December and called for a formal Party hearing on the subject. This hearing took place in April and was reported in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* of 24 April 1951, in an article giving the general Party findings and those of the Party primary organization of the Kazakh Pedagogic Institute. Kenesary was denounced at one meeting as "an enemy of the Kazakh toiling masses" by 11 speakers representing the Party leaders and the academic world. The attack was directed at others: school textbook authors Ismailov and Dzhumaliev, both professors of history; Sauranbaev, director of the Social Science Section of the Academy of Sciences; and one Adilgireev, all in addition to Bekmakhanov. But this was only the beginning.

The attack on Kazakh revivalism continued, centered around the figure of Kenesary, with a different series of authors subjected to the sternest criticism. The line now advanced by *Pravda*, the Party press of Kazakhstan, and the History Section of the Academy of Sciences, was that there were two kinds of leaders in Central Asia in the 18th and 19th centuries—good leaders and bad. The Kazakh leader Kenesary was bad; he was called a class enemy, a reactionary feudal lord. Other Kazakh leaders were classified as good, for they sought to lead their peoples into an alliance with the oppressed Russian masses, seeking a common solution for their jointly shared troubles. The Kazakh leader Isatai Taimanov, for example, revolted not against the Tsar but against Russian capitalists who were exploiting his people.[2] This indicates, the Soviets conclude, that the Tsars had parallel interests with the poor Russians, while the enemies of both the poor Russians and the poor Kazakhs were the Russian capitalists.

The central Soviet historical journal, *Voprosy Istorii* ("Questions of History"), published in April 1951 a lead editorial, "On Certain

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[1] *Pravda*, 26 Dec 50.
[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 19 Apr 51.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

KN 872 Certain other available data add some evidence on this matter. In 1950-1951 the proportions of school children in the total populations of five regions of Kazakhstan were as follows (expressed in percentages): Aktyubinsk, 15.0; Dzhambul, 20.2; East Kazakhstan, 18.3; Guryev, 17.6; and West Kazakhstan, 21.6.[1] Aktyubinsk and Guryev, the regions in K [872] which the school children formed the lowest proportion of the population, are primarily herding regions, populated largely by Kazakhs. Hence these incomplete data tend to support the conclusion that Kazakh children are underrepresented in the schools.

Today the number of people with more education is increasing, but there is no increase in the percentage of children starting school. The base of the education pyramid has not been enlarged.

K 177 Kazakhs resist Soviet education in those areas where education means giving up the traditional Kazakh culture. Even at best the Kazakh children are not being educated in numbers proportional to the total strength of the Kazakhs. This may mean that the Kazakh children are not going to school, or it may mean that some of those who go to school are going to Russian schools. Probably both factors are involved. The K [369] Kazakhs in the cities and in the industrial parts of Kazakhstan are accommodating to Soviet life more quickly than the rural, pastoral Kazakhs. Among the rural Kazakhs the traditional views of Russians, K [562] of schooling, of Sovietization, of the place of women in school and in life are still maintained. In rural regions the Kazakhs would be most reluctant to give their daughters to be trained in ways alien to their own. Their reluctance would be even greater if, for some of them, education meant giving up their native tongue for the Russian language. The literacy figures lend support to this, since literacy and mass education are closely related. In 1939, the last year for which a breakdown of literacy by sex is available, the literacy rate for the entire population of Kazakhstan was 76.3 per cent. The rate for males was 85.2 per cent, and that for females, 65.6 per cent. The traditional Kazakh view that women should be kept in the home and out of public life has not entirely yielded before the plans of the Soviet regime.

K KN 872 KN 563 Few data exist on the quality of instruction and the degree to which education in Kazakhstan is comparable to western standards. Certain conclusions are justified regarding the comparability of language instruction in Russian and Kazakh schools, however. The rate of failures in the higher educational institutions may be used as an index of the quality of the instruction offered in the Kazakh and Russian languages in the lower schools, since the graduates of these institutions become the teachers in the lower schools. In 1952 in Alma-Ata, the rate of failure was almost twice as high among the examinees in the Kazakh language as among those taking the Russian language. The rate of failure was 14.8 per cent in Russian, 27.8 per cent in Kazakh.[2]

The inference that the quality of education offered in the Kazakh language is lower than that given in Russian in Kazakhstan is borne out

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[1] *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Second edition.

[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 24 Sep 52.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

128 161 The official Soviet explanation of the Kazakh population loss serves to call attention to the problems of demographic method as applied in this case. The only known reference by the Soviets to the matter of Kazakh losses is related to the development of industry in Soviet Asia. The loss of Kazakhs is laid to the growth of industry in areas neighboring on Kazakhstan, primarily the growth of industrial towns and cities in the southern Urals (Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk) and in southern Siberia (Novosibirsk, the Kuzbass, etc.). This statement implies a movement of Kazakhs from their native steppes to the cities to join in industry, thereby giving up their Kazakhdom. By shifting from the steppes to the factories and mines they became Russified and were, so the implication runs, listed as Russians in the 1939 census.

This simple explanation of a seemingly complex matter immediately arouses suspicion. The official Soviet explanation addresses itself only to the growth of industry, which is a positive merit in the Soviet scheme. Hence, one wonders whether a negative fact, a possible source of embarrassment to the Soviet propagandist, is being counterbalanced by a positive fact, the growth of industry.

Investigation of the population loss revealed a complex problem which no single explanation could resolve. The Kazakhs numbered 3,968,289 in the census of December 1926, and 3,098,764 in the census of January 1939. The loss in the 13-year period was thus almost 900,000, or 22 per cent. This figure, moreover, refers only to the physical or absolute loss, and the problem is broader than that. The Kazakhs would have been reproducing themselves during that period. For an understanding of the dynamics of possible population growth, an insight may be gained from comparison with a neighboring people. The Kirgiz are Turks just as the Kazakhs are. The traditional occupation of both is the raising of herds; both are natives of Central Asia, and have been for many centuries. The Kirgiz, living under different conditions in the Soviet period, increased by some 16 per cent during the 1926-1939 period while the Kazakhs were decreasing. The Kirgiz rate of increase was about the average for the entire Soviet Union. With a similar population increase, there would have been 4,600,000 Kazakhs by 1939, instead of 3,100,000. Thus one is faced with a projected loss of about 1,500,000. It is this projected population figure which we must deal with, rather than the actual. Of this, no mention is made in the Soviet literature.

129 A fuller understanding of the Kazakh population loss was gained by an intensive examination of Kazakh history, especially in the 19th century. In the light of their past record, the reactions of the Kazakhs to the process of Sovietization became comprehensible. In this process the Kazakhs, traditionally herdsmen, were forced into collective farms and were required to perform tasks contrary to their traditions and beliefs. The population loss was traced to resistance to collectivization, with attendant mass arrests, flight across the borders, mass starvation, and death; to poor organization of collectives; and finally, to industrialization and Russification.

ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PROBLEM OF ACCULTURATION

121 177 The interpretation of what Sovietization means involves a broader methodological problem than the Kazakh question alone. One of the writers of the report had advanced the theory that in Sovietizing a people, the leaders of the USSR were performing what may be referred to as controlled acculturation. Acculturation in anthropology refers to

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the changes in one group of people which result from their coming into contact with another. This has been covered generally in the anthropological literature. However, contact between peoples, or the establishment of some kind of relationship by government, trade, or religious conversion, usually has been a matter of progressive development, not one of systematic planning based on a detailed preconceived notion of the new form the changing society will assume. The new idea in the Soviet scheme was that of the uniform transformation of all minority peoples in the Soviet Union to the new way of life. The use of force in this context has two purposes; it is used to maintain control; at the same time it is used to bring about change and control the direction of change. 121 177

The acculturation process may be described in terms of accommodation and conflict. What institutions do the people undergoing change possess to meet the change readily and accept it? On the other hand, what institutions do they have to oppose the change, to block off the culture contact? A balance sheet of the potential sources of accommodation and of conflict can be drawn up.

An example of this procedure may be taken from the process of forced collectivization of the Kazakhs. Herdsmen by tradition, the Kazakhs regard farming as a task for women and for those too poor to maintain themselves by herding. When the Soviets forced them to settle down on farms in the early 1930's, the Kazakhs resisted strongly. Their reactions might be compared to those of an American told to do something which questioned at once his manhood and his ability to support his family. But the response of the Kazakhs would be even stronger, because traditionally they have maintained a sharp separation between tasks which men perform, such as care of the herds, and tasks which women perform, such as farming. Further intensifying the response was the contempt of the Kazakh herdsman for the farmer.

The Soviet plan to settle the Kazakhs down on farms was motivated partly by economic considerations—to get the Kazakhs to raise farm produce in addition to herd produce. There was also a political factor; it is easier to control a population that is fixed in a definite place, as farmers are, than a group of nomads who might be anywhere within an area of a thousand square miles with their herds. But traditional Kazakh patterns of culture opposed and blocked Sovietization, partly due to the feelings of the people, partly due to their institutions.

On the other hand, certain aspects of the Kazakh way of life helped along the process of Sovietization. When the collective farms were set up, groups of Kazakhs who were blood kin were moved into them. The Kazakhs have traditionally lived and worked together in groups composed of such blood kin. Today, the typical collective farm is composed of closely related families, all descended from a common ancestor, who have been living in close contact with each other for hundreds of years. The Soviets, far from breaking up these groups, simply moved them bodily into the new farms. Thus there existed certain institutions which accommodated to and were readily adopted by the Soviet order.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Anyone engaged in Soviet studies faces the constant problem of the changing historical record: History is at times rewritten by Soviet writers. The comparison of the new version with the old presents two aspects. The first concerns the facts themselves: How have they been changed, that is, what facts have been suppressed and what new facts have now been made available? The second is a matter of the 127

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175 towards Russia, Turkey, and England. The cultural cohesion
631 created by Islam that connects Chinese Turkestan with Russian
668 Turkestan and other neighboring Muslim countries, and that
178 created by Buddhism that connects Mongolia with Tibet
619 through Chinghai and small areas of Sinkiang, marked the
648 four provinces of Sinkiang, Chinhai, Kansu, and to a small
degree, Shensi, as one single area which represents one
administrative unit.

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563 The Eastern Turks:

241 The main pattern of social life of the Eastern Turks is
based primarily on "Oasis Agriculture" with its irrigational
complex. All agriculture in this area is made possible through
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563 the organized use of water. The family organization among the
596 Eastern Turks is therefore an extended one, since a certain
level of productivity can only be reached through collective
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labor (upkeep of irrigational systems and dikes). One reason
[312] the Eastern Turks developed the extended family pattern
[241] is that the family recieves water in proportion to the amount
of labor its members put into the upkeep of irrigational
systems and canals; the greater the family, the more water
is therefore provided for their land.

The Internal structure of the family system is not based
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upon clan rules. Eastern Turkic communities are governed
[622] by a body of leaders, selected from the community itself
[634] whereas the larger governmental districts are headed by
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Chinese officials or, at present, by Chinese Communists.
563 A secondary aspect of Eastern Turkic social life is formed
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[441] by trade and handicrafts. Merchants and craftsmen form
"guilds" which in turn influence the social life of the community.

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Kirghiz and Kazakhs:

563 Kirghiz and Kazakh society is clan-based. (The definition
614 of the notion of "clan" is explained in the chapter about the
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Social Structure.) All family relationships are deeply rooted
563 in the clan system. The main pattern of social life among
233 these two tribes is created by their nomadic way of life, whose
361 most essential economic activity is cattle breeding. The transition
[177] to a semi-sedentary life is now under way. The Communists
[668] insist that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs occupy a permanent
winter camp site, since this facilitates better political
control over the tribes. The choice of the summer camp site
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still remains more or less in the hands of the tribes. Kirghiz
[622] and Kazakhs are ruled by "biks," or "manaps" (elders)
responsible to the Chinese officials.

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563 The Mongols: general remarks.

[233] Mongol social life is based on nomadic pastoralism. The
[594] basic unit is the nuclear family. A group of patrilineally

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175 However that may be, they continue to appear as one people a century later, and their present division into three hordes dates only from the 17th century. However, even after the Kazakhs had been divided into three hordes, they were united from time to time under mighty Khans, such as Khan Tiavka in 1698.[33] But at the beginning of the 18th century the three hordes were definitively separated.

[177] During their occupation of the steppes of Turkestan the Kazakhs have been at a constant state of war with the Kalmuks,[34] but they have interacted with the Kalmuks, or the western Mongols generally, on other levels as well: they have also intermarried with them, and some of the implications of this will be taken up below.

161 The Kazakhs in toto combined to form the second most numerous Turkic population in the world[35] at the end of the 19th century; this condition existed before that time, and is the case today as well. Levshin, whose data were gathered about the year 1830, reported the following population for the Kazakhs: a combined total in all the hordes of about 400,000 tents or families, which was to be multiplied according to Levshin

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[33] Barthold, Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. Ḳazaḳ.

[34] Spuler, 355-357.

[35] Aristov, Zametki, 350.

[Middle Horde]

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[616] Unlike the Great Horde, the Middle Horde had no trace of any dual organisation in its major divisions. Instead, it was divided directly into six clan federations: the Argyn, the Kipchak, the Kongrad, the Naiman, the Kirei, and the Uwak.[167] That these federations bore distinctive names is of interest, that these names are archaic is even more so. Four of these names have a great historical tradition, occurring both in the ancient Turkic records and in the Secret History of the Mongols; these are: the Kipchak, the Kongrad, the Naiman and the Kirei or Kereit. Another tie with the Mongol steppe, the historical scene of both Orkhon texts and the Secret History, is in the name Argyn; there is an Argun River in northwestern Manchuria, forming the border with Siberia.

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[177] The Middle Horde Kazakhs of the 1820's had not yet come under Russian cultural influence to any significant extent. Yet even at this time, the practice of polygyny was restricted to the wealthy families: a rich Kazakh might have from three to five wives, while a poor Kazakh had but one. Infant betrothal was practiced, while marriage took place at age twenty at the latest. On marriage the father outfitted the son with one or more tents, livestock, clothing, felts, according to his means; for then the son became of age. But the relationship was a

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[167] Valikhanov, 162; Aristov, Zametki, 350. Radloff, Aus Sibirien, I, 326, mentions only five of these federations, omitting the Uwak.

[Middle Horde]

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428 A number of salient features of Kazakh family life in the Middle Horde are brought to light in this case: the practice of allotment to all sons but the youngest during the lifetime of the father; the idea that they thus gave up all further rights in the estate of the father; the principle of ultimogeniture; the role of the bii in settling disputes; the break-up of family unity through a quarrel between or among brothers. The measure of the degree of acculturation is likewise made precise in this matter. We note a number of new features: the appeal to Russian practices in inheritance; appeal to the Russian courts to decide the matter; the resentment by the Kazakh community of the Russian appeal; the final decisive role of the Russian administration--which, it is important to note, found for the plaintiff in accordance with the Russian court's conception of what the Kazakh custom was, and rejecting the older brothers' notion of what the Russian custom in inheritance was. The flight to the town to escape the resentment of the community made by the youngest brother indicates nothing about acculturation: it could have been a new feature brought in by Russian contact, it could have been an old feature, because towns have existed in the vicinity of the steppe for many millenia.

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177 The Middle Horde differed from the Great Horde in two respects: it exhibits no trace of any dual organization, a feature of the large-scale social structure of

101 the Great Horde; and it was further along in the process
•177 of acculturation than the Great Horde. A Middle Horde Kazakh could adopt a "Russian" point of view and have the public opinion of his community support him in it a full generation anterior to even a remote envisagement of such a situation in the Great Horde. However, no significant difference in small-scale social structure, whether in the corporate entities or in the kinship relationships, can be detected.

000 Note: Appended to this chapter is material gathered on the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde during the period of the First World War and the 1920's. It is separated from the body of the Kazakh materials since it represents an era removed from the preceding one by a war and a revolution.

The Little Horde: Clan and Lineage

101 The Little Horde, Kazakh *kǐy yüs*, literally Little Hundred, occupied the steppe between the Middle Horde and European Russia, stretching from the area north of the Aral Sea to the Ural River. The steppe between the Ural River and the Volga was in turn occupied by an offshoot of the Little Horde, the Bukei, or Inner Horde
631 during the 19th century. In the structure of the Little
616 Horde, certain marks of a dual organization are to be
619 observed: it consisted of two major divisions, the Alchyn and the Djätti-uri. The Djätti-uri in turn were sub-

[Little Horde]

161 1876 and 1885; the Lesser Horde contained 150,000 to 160,000 families, and the Inner Horde about 30,000.[175] This represents about a 20 percent increase over the figure given for the Little Horde alone in 1830 of
●177 160,000 families by Levshin.[176] The Little and Inner Hordes were closest to European Russia, and had been the longest of all in close contact with the Russians; the degree of acculturation was not different in any marked manner from that of the Middle Horde Kazakhs. Because of the readier accessibility of the Little Horde, however, we have fuller data on certain aspects of their social structure and kinship relations than we have for the more distantly situated hordes.

614 The clans of the Little Horde, as those of all the other hordes, were organized on the basis of patrilineal descent from a common ancestor; this ancestor sometimes gave his name to the clan; otherwise the clan name was drawn from the stock of names which are associated with glorious events, great traditions designed to inspire the Kazakh warriors to emulate those who bore that name in the past. One clan name in the Little Horde was Yappas, a derivation from the name Japhet, the son of Noah, who appears ever again in Kazakh etymologies; other clan

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[175] Schuyler, I, 34; Lansdell, I, 303-304. The lower estimate is that of von Hellwald, 80. Schuyler and Lansdell gathered their materials through interviewing local officials.

[176] Levchine, 300.

597 of deceased brother's children. Again, an affianced girl who has been orphaned may be raised by her father-in-law, who has an interest in her upbringing in view of the kalym already paid for her.[224] This is to be distinguished from adoption per se because, while it does mean the taking up of children not one's own, the female never becomes fully incorporated into her husband's family.

The Inner or Bukei Horde

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177 The Horde named for Khan Bukei was the last such formation among the Kasakh hordes. It was formed in the year 1800 when some 1500 Kasakhs of the Little Horde crossed the New Cossack lines to occupy the steppe between the Ural River and the left bank of the Volga, a steppe left empty for a generation by the flight of the Kalmuks to China and occupied only by wild horses and saiga antelope.[225] The leader of the new horde, Khan Bukei, was encouraged to do so by the Russians, who were seeking to pacify the steppe, and the move was willingly undertaken by the Khan partly for financial considerations, and partly through fear of the internecine wars and raids on the steppe beyond the Ural River.[226]

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[224] Plotnikov, 124.

[225] Ivanin, 5-7.

[226] Ibid., 7-9.

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of the estates, the clan and lineage formation is a vertical cleavage. A *söök* might be identical with a *byr top* in any given instance, but the principle upon which it was based was different. The horizontal cleavage was derived from the superposition of one layer of society upon another, and was a means of building the social hierarchy. The vertical cleavage could fit the system of a social hierarchy or a polysegmentary system without a supra-clan hierarchy equally well; an example of the latter alternative, a polysegmentary clan-lineage formation without aristocratic and commoner estates is found in the Kara-Kirgis social structure.

Appendix: Kazakh of the Altai

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Two expeditions to the Naiman division of the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde were undertaken by a number of Turkic specialists in the 1920's. The localities they concentrated on were in the extreme northeast corner of Kazakhstan, hence difficult of access, in rugged country and were presumably chosen by the ethnographers Bukeikhan, Baronov, Margulanov, and Rudenko, and the linguist Samoilovich because here the degree of acculturation (such was not their term) would be lowest of any part of the Kazakh world. The account of the Altai Kazakhs has been separated from the rest of the data on the Kazakhs and put into this appendix. A word is needed in answer to (1) why the following data are incorporated at all, and

101 127 177 (2) why they are separated from the text proper. As to why the Soviet era data are added, it may be said at once that they are marginally Soviet: they were gathered in the 1920's, and from an outlying province where the impact of Soviet acculturation had barely begun; and again, fully recognizing the acculturated life of these people, certain factors have remained constant, "recognisable," from the past, and the data regarding them supplement descriptions of the previous era, fill in old gaps. The resultant picture has historical significance, it tells what happened later; it has comparative significance, it permits the confrontation of Kazakh data with other data, such as the Kalmuk. But the post-revolutionary report is separated from the pre-revolutionary data because of the great changes in the life of the component peoples of the Russian empire.

Clan and Lineage

167 101 175 619 The Kazakhs of the Naiman division are sometimes called a tribe. Adequately detailed genealogical data afford a considerable amount of insight into the structure of the Kazakh clan and lineage. We are faced with a distinction which has been encountered several times in the course of the present study: the distinction between "objective" history and history as mythopoeia. As to the first, Margulanov tells us that these Naiman, in branching off (ramifying, as Firth has put it) from

8:Kostenko -40-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan

Kazak RQ
Sart RN4

K 203 574 khabar is exactly the same as having an invitation ready in one's pocket to a filling dinner in any aul. As soon as the newcomer says that there is khabar, he is regaled at once and he eats and relates it to his hosts. Then at once one of his hosts uses this opportunity to get something to eat in the next aul, and hurries off there with the news. This explains the unusual speed with which rumors spread in the steppe.

● K 177 Upon contact with advanced nations, the Kazakhs adopt their superficial gloss and their habits for themselves with remarkable rapidity, but without losing their own nationality or being contemptuous of it. K [811] The sciences are quite accessible to them and they understand especially easily an analytic type of exposition. K [609] They do the Russians full justice, recognizing in them a moral and physical advantage. Thus they have the saying: Sary-kazak kara-kalmak, sary-urus kara-kazak, which means, the Kazakh is as much whiter or brighter than the Kalmyk as the Russian is more than the Kazakh. This proverb applies just as much to moral qualities. Thus the Kazakhs often come to Russian functionaries to be tried.

/352/ The Sarts

S 101 The origin of the Sarts. There is no Sart people. But the Russians have followed the nomads in using this name for the sedentary population of Turkestan, the people who live in the towns and villages and work in agriculture, the crafts and in trade. The people who have been given this name differ greatly both in language and in origin, but possess

RLI
Kazak KQa

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at the top so that the kosh looks like a felt cone.

[177] The incomparable qualities of a yurt in summer have been appreciated not only by the armies but also by the Russian inhabitants of Turkestan. The householder who is only the slightest bit wealthy provides himself with such a yurt or yulameika, which he puts up in his garden near his house. In such yulameikas they can be free of the suffocating heat which makes it impossible to sleep in the house.

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A Description of Some Important Populated Places

A description of the town of Tashkent: the Asiatic and Russian parts. Vernyi /Alma Ata/. Kuldja. Samarkand. Khodzhent /Leninabad/. Ura-Tyube.

Tashkent

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Tashkent is the center of the government of the whole region of Turkestan. Both in size and in expanse it is one of the most spacious towns not only in the Turkestan region but in all of Central Asia. In number of inhabitants it is comparable only with Bukhara, and in expanse with Kokand. This is one of the oldest towns, and its origin is lost in the mists of time. It is situated at 41° 19'32" north, and 38° 57'58" east. Tashkent is located on a flat plateau beginning about 30 versts from Chimkent, and is surrounded on three sides with gardens, while the fourth side is contiguous with the Russian town.

1: Barthold H-4 (no date) 1927

RP2 Kirgiz RP2
Kazak RQ2

Ki 177 the valley of the Tekes and to throw these lands open for Russian colonisation. An autonomous "territory of the Ḳarā Ḳirghīz" or Ḳirghīzistān has now been constituted with Pishpek as capital (the term "Ḳarā" was never adopted by the people themselves and is now definitely repudiated).

Ka 101 Until recently in both Russia and Western Europe the name "Kirgiz" meant particularly the Ḳazāḳ; they are sometimes called also "Kirgiz-Kaisak" (Kaisak, corrupted from Kazak, to distinguish them from the Russian Cossacks). Ka 175 On the separation of the Ḳazāḳ from the Özbeg, cf. the articles ABU 'L-KHAIR and ḲAZĀḲ. The whole of the Ḳazāḳ people was for long under the rule of one Khān who therefore had a considerable military force at his disposal; Khān Ḳāsim (d. 924 = 1518) was particularly powerful. In spite of several defeats from the Mongols allied with the Özbegs in the xvith century, the Ḳazāḳ still had a strong nomad kingdom at the end of this century under the rule of Khān Tawakkul, who, during the last years of the reign of Khān 'Abd Allāh b. Iskandar [q.v.], was able to make a successful incursion into Mā warā al-Nahr and even later still held the town of Tāshkent. In the xviith century the power of the Khāns only rarely extended over the whole people; but about this time Tāshkent and Farghāna were usually in the possession of the Ḳazāḳ, sometimes under nominal recognition of the suzerainty of the Khāns of the Özbegs. Ka [631] At this time must have taken place the division of the Ḳazāḳ into three "Hordes" (called by the Ḳazāḳ themselves *djüs* "hundred"); the great horde (*uln djüs*) occupied the most easterly, the little (*kishi djüs*) the most westerly part of the so-called "Kirgiz steppes" and between the two the central horde (*orta djüs*). Towards the end of the xviith century this division was already an accomplished fact. Khān Tyawka, celebrated as the law-giver of his people (in 1694 a Russian embassy was received by him in the town of Turkistān and in 1698 one from the Kalmucks), still ruled all three Hordes and had a representative in each of them. In 1717 unsuccessful negotiations for the submission of all three Hordes to Peter the Great were conducted; in 1723 the towns of Sairām, Tāshkent and Turkistān were conquered by the Kalmucks. For a short period after this the suzerainty of the Khān of the Little Horde was recognised by all the Ḳazāḳ and the agreement Ka [648] doing this was sealed by the sacrifice of a white horse but the treaty had no practical results. In 1730, Abu 'l-Khair negotiated with Russia and concluded a treaty by which he declared himself and his people Russian subjects. This treaty was renewed several times in the xviiith century; but it was not till the xixth century, especially after 1847, when the Russians were firmly established on the southern frontier of the Kirgiz steppes on the Sīr Daryā, that Russian rule became definitely established over the steppes and their inhabitants

Ka 177 [565] The eastern part of the steppes was administered from Siberia and the western from Orenburg; regulations for the government of the Siberian Ḳazāḳ were published in 1822 and again in 1868. Even after the abolition of the Khān's authority, the descendants of Čingiz Khān or "Sulṭāns" exercised a considerable influence over the people as a nobility (among the Ḳazāḳ called "white bones", *aḳ süyek*); their authority has been gradually destroyed by the measures of the Russian Government. The last

P. 1026-A

1: Barthold H-4 (no date) 1927

RP2 Kirgiz RP2

Kazak RQ2

Ka. 177 popular leader of the Ḳazāḳ, Kenesarī, who fought against the authorities in Siberia and Orenburg from 1842, was killed in 1847 in the mountains of Ala Tau; several risings were stirred up down to 1873 by his son Sadik (so-called by the Russians, properly Ṣiddīḳ). Another son, Aḥmad, later wrote the life of his father Kenesarī and of his brother Sadik, entitled: *Sultanī Kenisara i Sadik. Biografičeskiye očerki sultana Akhmeta Kenisarina. Obrabotano dlye pečati i snabženo primečaniyami E. T. Smirnowīm*, Tāshkent 1889. Review by V. Rosen in *Zap.*, iv., p. 122 *sq.*

The most southern part of the Kirgiz steppes was conquered in the xixth century by the Özbegs of Farghāna and Khīwa and partly colonised; the advance of the Russians in this part was therefore assisted by the Ḳazāḳ. After the foundation of the general-gouvernement of Turkestān (1867) and the general-gouvernement of the Steppes (1882), Semirečye belonged at first to the latter, but was later again united to Turkestān), the government of the Kirgiz steppes had less unity than before. On the other hand after the revolution an administrative unit was established called at first by the Russians the "Kirgiz Republic" and by the people themselves "Ḳazāḳistān"; since 1924 this "Republic" has included a vast territory, little smaller than Russia in Europe, but of course less thickly populated. According to the latest Russian figures before the revolution the Ḳazāḳ numbered about 4,000,000 compared with about 500,000 genuine Kirgiz. The present numbers of the population cannot be very different from these. Čuloshnikow's (see below) reckoning by which the Ḳazāḳ and true Kirgiz would now be about 8,500,000 together is certainly much too high. In the northern part of the Kirgiz steppes between 1920 and 1923 the population is known to have declined by 21.2%. According to figures in the official publication *Sowetskaya Kirgiziya* (1924, N°. 8—9, p. 4), the population of the "Kirgiz Republic" is 6,536,000 including 4,008,310 Kirgiz (61.3%).

Ka 161

Ki 113

The *Bibliography* of the Kirgiz is very large: see the attempts to collect it in A. Kharuzin (*Etnograf. Obozreniye*, 1891 and 1892) and A. Alektorow (*Izv. Obshč. Arkh. etc. Kazan*, xx. 1904). The fullest history of the Kirgiz steppes is that by A. Levshin, *Opisaniye Kirgiz-kaisakskikh ord i stepei*, St. Petersburg 1832; this is supplemented by many quotations (especially from the *Ta'rīkh-i Rashīdī* and the *'Abd Allāh Nāme*) in Welyaminow-Zernow, *Issledowaniya o kasimowskikh tsaryakh i tsarevičakh*, vol. ii. On the everyday life (esp. of the Ḳazāḳ) in the xixth century: W. Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1893, vol. i.; do., *Proben der Volkslitteratur* etc., vol. iii. and v. On laws: N. Grodekow, *Kirgizī i Kara-Kirgizī Sīr-Daryinskoi Oblasti*, Tashkent 1889; review by N. Veselowskiy in *Zap.*, v. 115 *sqq.* On present conditions: *Obzor narodnogo khozaistva Kirgizskoi A. S. S. R. 1924 god. Pod redakciyei J. P. Krutilina*, Orenburg 1925. Later essays on the history of the Kirgiz: A. Čuloshnikow, *Očerki iz istorii Kazak-Kirgizskogo naroda, Čast' I. Drevneye vremya i sredniye veka*, Orenburg 1924. M. Tinishpayew, *Materialī dlya istorii Kirgiz-kazakskogo naroda*, Tashkent 1925. (W. BARTHOLD)

P. 1026-B

177.16 ----- 177.87

596 and valuistically oriented toward the need for sons,
patricentric-filiocentric. The Kazakh family in the
early Soviet era was conservative, even archaic in these
respects; in others, a number of acculturative innova-
● 177.55 tions had intervened. The eradication of the distinc-
556 tion between black bone and white bone had been complete
by then; the social stratification was now simplified to
rich and poor; even influence reckoned in terms of the
number of kinsmen came to play a subordinate role.[284]
A wealthy Kazakh would find those eager to establish
a close agnatic relationship with him, support him in
disputes, and thus seek his favor.

595 The factor of wealth determined not only the number
556 of those who asserted close consanguinity, it also cor-
related directly with affinity. Polygyny was permitted
and continued to be practiced into the 1920's,[285] al-
though the Soviet regime sought half-heartedly to make
monogamy universal (checked at that time by a laissez-
faire policy toward nationalities). The wealthy Kazakh
could afford plural wives, although he rarely had more
than two; there is one case of an exceptionally important
man who had three wives, but his circumstances indicate
his outstanding position; for example, his *aul* had 13
tents in it, whereas the *aul* in these parts ranged between

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[284] Ibid., 66.

[285] Ibid., 67.

[Great Horde]

622 611 602 692 because of the rule of lineage exogamy. The members of an aul generally were related because one's most trusted friend was one's closest kinsman, upon whom one could place the greatest reliance for mutual aid measured in wealth or arms. And the bii himself embodied the agnatic principle because he was in the ideal circumstance the senior male in the ranking family of a Kazakh community.

177.6 601 One effect of culture contact at the end of the 19th century, we have seen, was the organization of the Kazakhs into Russian administrative units; and despite this new mode of social organization, certain structural principles continued to exert their force: namely, the inhabitants of a given district recognized either a real or assumed kinship with others of the district. The acculturative process may be further examined to see which structural features survived as the least common denominator of Kazakh life, and which were stripped away. 177. 56 565 The division of the Kazakhs into estates by seniority of descent lines through primogeniture and differential succession has been discussed. These estates, the white bone or aristocracy, and the black bone or commoners, did not intermarry until after the Russian conquest, when the young people of the succeeding generation, that is, from the late 1880's and on, began to ally themselves in marriage, regardless of white or black estate, without difficulty.[94]

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[94] Dingelstedt, 146.

[Great Horde]

177 56 565 The reason is clear: the ak süök or white "bone" had been the political rulers in the steppe in view of their descent from Khans and illustrious exponents of Islam. While they had remained the political rulers of the Kazakhs it was important to maintain the quality of their estate by recourse to a rule of endogamy, thus preserving their [556] superiority over the black "bone." When the political meaning of the separateness disappeared,[1] the practice of endogamy between the estates disappeared; and correlated with this change was the greater emphasis on wealth for social distinction: we have seen how the bii was often chosen at this time because of his wealth rather than by birth.[2]

The ak süök no longer had any legal privileges; their principal mark of social distinction was in terms of respect, a special place at feasts and ceremonies, and so forth.[95] Thus the estate in the past was a political structure embodying principles of the consanguineal system of the Kazakhs. It disappeared, but the kinship system upon which it was based remained in an altered form.

621 The nomadic village was until Russian times a patrilineal kin group, a portion of a lineage. It conformed to the theory of the corporate structure advanced here

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[95] Idem.

[1] [Cf. cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, p. 414.-- Analyst]

[2] [Cf. cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, p. 411 ff.-- Analyst]

[Inner Horde]

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601 where part of the gifts were made over to the chief of the Alim-uli. The reasons given by Kharuzin for clan [177.61] decline generally,[1/A] as part of the acculturation picture, are: administrative changes imposed by the Russians, the growth of sedentary agriculture, and the consequent loss of nomadic pastoralism.[240]

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561 The lineage was the exogamic unit in the 1880's, and leadership of the lineage passed to the eldest son. However, it might rest temporarily with the first or senior wife until the eldest son came of age; here again seniority was operative, among the wives as well as among the sons.[241] There is regrettably no indication of the number of generations in establishing an exogamic unit among the Kazakhs of the Inner Horde.

565 The standard composition of the noble estate is: the ak süök descended from Chingis Khan, and the Islamic leaders among the Kazakhs, called Khodja. They were [177. 56] formerly free from tax and tribute, but with the advent of the Russians were so no longer. However, they were not subject to the judgments of the biis, and hence had a kind of legal immunity. The other component of the white bone was the Khodja, i.e., Kazakhs who, by a genealogical fiction, traced their descent from Mohammed.[242]

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[240] Kharuzin, op. cit., cols. 45-47.

[241] Ibid., 110.

[242] Ibid., 47-52.

[1/A] [Cf. cat. 11b, AH1 Mongolia, p. 496 ff.--Amdgst.]

[Little Horde]

587 property of the deceased was distributed equally among the surviving brothers. If she had one son, and no matter how many daughters, her children were not taken away from her; all remained by her. But if she had only daughters, and no sons, then they were taken away from her and given to the husband's brothers to raise, and she was permitted to keep one daughter at the most by her.[212]

177.58
587 This was the idealized model of the family around the year 1870; actually the acculturative process had begun, of which the contemporary reporters were aware; and they regarded it as the result of Russian influence. Thus, a degree of loosening of the practice of the levirate was noted, and a newly widowed woman was adjured rather than commanded: "Thou hast the right to reject one person, but not the entire line or clan [of the husband]. With thousands of people there will be at least one who will meet your taste."[213] The widow was considerably freer than the unmarried girl, for she was not under the thumb of a father, and had some choice or option. The husband's family, moreover, was telling her that she should stay among the agnatic kin of her deceased husband, that that was where by custom she should stay, and continue that line which was in the larger

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[212] Balliuzek, 99-100.

[213] Ibid., 101.

[Little Horde]

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sense her husband's; but they were losing control over her.

A generation later it was only a memory that the widow had once necessarily remarried leviratically, and by the turn of the century a number of alternatives had been opened to her in the Little Horde. She might indeed marry her deceased husband's brother; again she might simply go to live in the household of the latter informally; or she might marry away from her husband's kin entirely.[214]

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Divorce was rare in the 1870's.[215] In the following generation, the same general pattern still existed in divorce as elsewhere on the steppe: the husband needed very little grounds to divorce his wife; the wife was limited to the following grounds—impotence and maltreatment on the part of the husband. The latter is a variant on the desertion or nonsupport for a year as the wife's grounds for divorce. However, she was also permitted to divorce her husband by the turn of the century if he was unfaithful to her. The divorced woman was simply returned to her father; if she married again, it was without the formalities of the kalym, the go-between, and so forth.[216] Husband's infidelity as

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[214] Karutz, Kirg's Hochzeit, 42.

[215] Balliuzek, 90.

[216] Karutz, loc. cit.

[Little Horde]

177,58
586 ground for divorce occurs now for the first time and may be added to the general transformation of certain traits through acculturation.

428 **Rules of Inheritance and Succession**

We have seen that the estate of a brother was equally distributed among the surviving brothers on his death. The equal division of a man's estate among his survivors is only one aspect of a complex problem. The practice of allotment or apportionment of sons as they came of age was the basic mode of transmission of physical property, which together with the payment of the *kalym* on behalf of the son, formed part of the total property transfer when the son came of age. For the coming of age was associated with marriage, and entailed both the payment of the *kalym* and the apportionment of the son.[217]

The youngest son, in contrast to his elder brothers, was not portioned off during the lifetime of the father, although the *kalym* was paid on his behalf when he came of age, that is to say, when he was married. He shared his father's estate during the father's lifetime, and did not take up full possessive rights until his father's death, when he became the sole residuary legatee of the

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[217] Balliuzek, 104.

[Inner Horde]

429 ciple of primogeniture. The custom of ultimogeniture, whereby the youngest son was the residuary legatee and likewise received the title of "prince of the hearth," also was practiced. Despite this favored treatment of the youngest son, the actual authority passed to the eldest son, ceteris paribus, i.e., if he were of good health in mind and body, etc.[247]

586 596 177.59 Divorce is reported as having been easy and frequent among the Kasakhs of the Inner Horde,[248] but since this is totally unlike other reports on the Kasakhs, it is to be understood as a reflection of acculturative conditions, and not a normal situation. Nevertheless, patriarchal authority, and the extended family as a continuing unit, tended to resist acculturation: the daughter-in-law would be chosen not by the son in question, nor yet by his father necessarily, but by the patriarchal head of the entire extended family.[249] [591] On the other hand, under the conditions of culture contact, a tendency toward neo-local marriage residence arose in the closing decades of the 19th century.[250]

601 Kinship Terminology: General Considerations

The Kasakh kinship terminology differs in many

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[247] Ibid., 108-111.

[247] Ibid., 108-111.

[248] Ibid., 108.

[249] Ibid., 110.

[250] Idem.

[Great Horde]

622 because of the rule of lineage exogamy. The members of
611 an aul generally were related because one's most trusted
602 friend was one's closest kinsman, upon whom one could
692 place the greatest reliance for mutual aid measured in
wealth or arms. And the bii himself embodied the agnatic principle because he was in the ideal circumstance the senior male in the ranking family of a Kazakh community.

● 177.6 One effect of culture contact at the end of the 19th
601 century, we have seen, was the organization of the Kazakhs into Russian administrative units; and despite this new mode of social organization, certain structural principles continued to exert their force: namely, the inhabitants of a given district recognized either a real or assumed kinship with others of the district. The acculturative process may be further examined to see which structural features survived as the least common denominator of
177.56 Kazakh life, and which were stripped away. The division
565 of the Kazakhs into estates by seniority of descent lines through primogeniture and differential succession has been discussed. These estates, the white bone or aristocracy, and the black bone or commoners, did not intermarry until after the Russian conquest, when the young people of the succeeding generation, that is, from the late 1880's and on, began to ally themselves in marriage, regardless of white or black estate, without difficulty.[94]

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[94] Dingelstedt, 146.

[Inner Horde]

613 called ata-bala. An important acculturative note in this connection is that taifa[7] is of Arabic origin, introduced into the Turkic social organization through the intermediation of Islam.[235] The term ata-bala is a bineme composed of the words for father and for child, thus indicating the indigenous conception of the patrilineal descent principle. The clan had disappeared in the Inner Horde by the 1880's, the clan uran was forgotten, together with the clan cattle-brand or tamga. These tamga were not property marks, they were clan signs.[236] Lineages had come to take over clan functions, becoming the named units to which people attributed membership, with their cries and brands. On the other hand, many clans might be combined into one unit.[237] by the process of fusion.

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614 The clan had become an administrative unit under the Khan, who in turn was in the Russian service; the clan leader was selected by the central administration. The clan was no longer collectively responsible for the debts of a member as it had been in previous times according to Kharusin's report. 614 On the other hand, the clan had been the unit of exogamy as late as 1816, when

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[235] Radlov, Opyt Slovaria, s.v. taifa.

Radlov, Opyt Slovaria, s.v. taifa.

[236] Kharusin, Bukeev Orda, column 48.

[237] Ibid., 41-43.

7[i.e. a "lineage" of the Inner Horde; cf. cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, p. 496, bot. --Analyst]

[Inner Horde]

614 619 601 where part of the gifts were made over to the chief of the Alim-uli. The reasons given by Kharuzin for clan [177.61] decline generally,[1/A] as part of the acculturation picture, are: administrative changes imposed by the Russians, the growth of sedentary agriculture, and the consequent loss of nomadic pastoralism.[240]

613 561 The lineage was the exogamic unit in the 1880's, and leadership of the lineage passed to the eldest son. However, it might rest temporarily with the first or senior wife until the eldest son came of age; here again seniority was operative, among the wives as well as among the sons.[241] There is regrettably no indication of the number of generations in establishing an exogamic unit among the Kazakhs of the Inner Horde.

565 The standard composition of the noble estate is: the ak söök descended from Chingis Khan, and the Islamic leaders among the Kazakhs, called Khodja. They were [177.56] formerly free from tax and tribute, but with the advent of the Russians were so no longer. However, they were not subject to the judgments of the biis, and hence had a kind of legal immunity. The other component of the white bone was the Khodja, i.e., Kazakhs who, by a genealogical fiction, traced their descent from Mohammed.[242]

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[240] Kharusin, op. cit., cols. 4

[240] Kharusin, op. cit., cols. [illegible].

[241] Ibid., 110.

[242] Ibid., 47-52.

[1/A] [Cf. cat. 11b, AH1 Mongolia, p. 496 ff.--Analyst]

[Altai Kazakhs]

613 have been the statement, for example, of Cham, M. Chamov's father. Chamov himself would have to marry outside his _ata_, those who shared with him a common ancestor in the ascending paternal line in the person of Sary, the son of Sargaldak, the _süök_ founder; Sary was the founder of the _ata_ in question, he being in the seventh ascending generation from Chamov. However, it would be dangerous to infer a universal rule from these data, for we have seen that the exogamic principle has been subject to considerable variation throughout the steppe, and among the Kazakhs as well.

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563 A number of marks of acculturation are to be observed in the genealogy and commentaries on it.[1] First of all, the concept of the _süök_ has changed: no longer is there a distinction between _ak süök_ and _kara süök_;[2] whatever social distinction there was, was made between rich and poor Kazakhs, on the basis of wealth and not of birth; Rudenko's comment that family and social life among the Kazakhs was very archaic and conservative in form[264] to the contrary notwithstanding. Again, a Russian system of patronymics was instituted, whereby the Kazakh Chamov was called thus because his father bore the name Cham, thus establishing a system of family names which had never existed before. A follow-up ethnography would probably show a considerable rigidifica-

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[264] Rudenko, op. cit., 66.

[1] [Cf. cat. 116, AHI Mongolia, p. 527 ff. --Analyst]

[2] [i.e. nobles and commoners. Cf. cat. 116, AHI Mongolia, pp. 500-501 --Analyst]

[Altai Kazakhs]

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tion of the structural outlines, a loss of fluidity which can best be shown by examining units smaller than the lineage, such as the village and family.

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The chaotic situation in which the larger descent groups found themselves in by the 1920's--aside from the rigidification of the structural principles--may be seen in the loss of the clan war-cry and cattle-brand. The war-cry or uran now appertained not to the clan, but to the entity which has been identified as the major lineage or byr top. The cattle markings, which were literally ear-marks, tamga, cut into the cattle's ear, were distributed by component sub-lineages or süök, of the byr top.[265]

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[631]
Acculturative influences, both economic and political in manifestation, have acted to deprive the Kazakh clan and lineage of many functions. Administratively, the Kazakhs were now settled, in a hierarchy of Russian units, the uezd, the okrug, the volost'. These have remained to this day, with the exception of the volost'. Residence and the distribution of camps, pasturages, etc., have come to be reckoned by administrative units, such as the uezd among these Kazakhs, and one of the incidental effects of acculturation has been the sharpening of the džien relation.[1] This has taken the following form: In the Altai district (okrug),

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[265] Samoilovich, 310-311.

[1] [cf. cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, p. 509ff.--Analyst]

613 one of the uezdy is the Karkaralinsk, occupied in the ●177.61 main by the Shorkarakesek lineage, and with a minority 601 from another lineage, the Karaul. These Karaul members are settled likewise in three other uezdy. Now the descent is still agnatic primarily, and residence is patrilocal. Nevertheless, one of the Karaul sub-lineages reckoned its descent through the daughters of the sub-lineage founder, one Botyshor, and are known as the Botyshor džien (Botyshor's daughter's sons). They live among the Karaul lineage, not among their patrilineal kinsmen who would have been Botyshor's kuyeu (Da Hu). These džien nevertheless preserved their patrilineal affiliations, at least in the reckoning of kinship.[266]

Significantly, group membership is determined now by administrative district in which one dwells or one's group dwells. This in itself has had the consequence of extending the džien relationship to a field where it had not been remarked before: in addition to various functions related to inheritance and the distribution of the parental estate, and to the paying of the kalym or bridewealth, the džien relation is now seen to be a means for establishing residence, descent, the occupation of common pasturage, etc. A sub-lineage such as the Botyshor džien asserted their right through kinship with the Mo Fa to dwell and nomadize with, or at least in the

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[266] Rudenko, op. cit., 59.

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same district with, their cognatic kinsmen. This does not mean that descent has come to be traced bilaterally; it is necessary to differentiate, for the purposes of this analysis, between bilateral and cognatic descent and kinship. Except for the lacuna of one generation, that necessary to establish the relationship with the Mo Fa line, descent is still reckoned patrilineally, and the dźien likewise maintain their own agnatic relationships; although how long the latter will survive if they are not closely correlated with actual functions is questionable. From all this, it may be concluded that the extension of the dźien relationship to the residence and pasturage unit is a consequence of acculturation, and not a spelling out of innate dynamics of Kazakh development. Nevertheless it is consonant with tendencies already set in motion, at least in the 19th century if not earlier, to assign ever wider functions to the dźien, a nonagnatic relationship.

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Lineages continued to change place of residence and fuse with other lineages in the 1920's, forming a sub-lineage süök among other component süök of a byr top (major lineage) and retain its original name. Thus, for instance, a group of Argun Kazakhs moved in among the Karatai byr-top of the Ergenekti ruu of the Naiman division of the Middle Horde. These Argun continued to be identified as such, that is, the sub-lineage which they now formed was known by that name, but they

000 administrative relations, hence Radlov's idea that his office was a usurpation.

The Village of the Great Horde

621 The aul or nomadic village (literally, enclosure)
of the Kazakhs was a phenomenon of the winter season
when its members gathered at the customary encampment
[177. after the summer dispersal.[86] These auls were generally
62] composed of closely related families: such at least was
the case prior to the end of the 19th century, at which
time they were transformed into sedentary units with
fixed localities through Russian administrative dispositions
and through the increase in agriculture. In certain
cases the winter camps might be composed of several
auls, forming a larger grouping for mutual cooperation
and protection. The concentration of people often required
the removal of the herds from the main winter
camp, and hence more men would be needed to guard them,
making common cause, and defending each other against
marauders, both human and animal, of whom the steppe was
full. But the close conjunction of many Kazakhs who recognized
only vague authority relations among themselves required
the constant recourse to the biis[1] in the resolution
of disputes.[87]

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[86] Dingelstedt, 214.

[87] Radloff, op. cit., I, 513-514.

[1] [i.e. elders; cf. cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, pp.411-412--Analyst]

[Great Horde]

622 The village head or elder was the aksakal (literally, 177. white board),[88] who was the senior male member of the 62 highest ranking family as measured by birth in the village. His social position was somewhat comparable to that of the bii, his functions likewise, and it is only later, in consequence of Russian administrative reforms and regularisations that a clear-cut distinction is possible. Radlov reports that toward the end of the century, the bii was the village leader, being the senior member of the wealthiest family in the village, or the eldest male in that family which, in addition to its claim to priority by right of birth or wealth, had the largest number of closely related families in the village to back it up. The inference to be drawn is that the bii, who was a man who regulated affairs between village-kin-groups, now dominated over several groups who formerly had occupied different villages, but now to an ever increasing degree were combined in one. His functions remained the same, it is merely that the composition of the village had changed. By Radlov's day, the Kazakh aul which had an influential bii was usually a combination of several units which formerly would have been separate auls, or else it was one aul which was expanded by the addition of remnants of other auls in the form of families which had once combined to make them up.[89] In

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[88] Levchine, 330.

[89] Radloff, Aus Sibirien, I, 513.

[Great Horde]

622 a similar manner, we have seen this very process at work
0177.62 in the formation of new lineages,[1] whether maximal or minimal, or even clans, with the exception that the process here described involves the transformation of the village through new developments in administration and economy. Nevertheless, the acculturative pattern took on traditional forms, that is, the new village was built up by a process already encountered in lineage fusion. The bii, through his wealth, spiritual powers, sense of justice, and large number of kin (who were able to support his word if necessary by their very strength of numbers) thus continued to dominate the new forms of Kazakh life.[90]

622 177.62 692 At the end of the century, the bii[2] was regarded by the Russians as a kind of official judge, beneath whom was the aksakal, recognized as a popular judge who lived within the village, regulated its affairs in an informal manner. The bii, in contrast, concerned himself largely with inter-aul matters, which is a formalization of the relative positions as they had been reported in the previous era.[91] One of the most important functions of the bii, whether in the matter of inter-aul, or intra-aul relationships, was the determination and resolution of conflict regarding the winter pasturages.

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[90] Ibid., I, 513-514.

[91] Sabataev, 66. Sabataev's observations bear rather on the Kazakhs of the Middle and Little Hordes, but may be taken to be relevant for the Kazakhs generally.

[1] [cf. especially Cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, p. 405 ff.--Analyst]

[2] [i.e. elder; cf. cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, p. 411 ff.--Analyst]

[Little Horde – Mangyshlak Kazaks]

613 generations.

Finally, attention should be drawn to the workings of another structural principle: the ranking of the minor or sub-lineages according to the priority of birth of the founder by virtue of the principle of differential inheritance and succession.

The Village in the Little Horde

621 Meyendorff made a journey from Orenburg in the southern Ural mountains to Bukhara in the year 1820. In the territory of the Little Horde he encountered a village which was the camp of a great Kazakh chief. By comparison with other villages, Meyendorff accounted this one a large village, containing fifty tents, grouped in clusters of from three to six tents each. He passed through this _aul_ in the month of October, presumably when these pastoralists had gathered together in their winter camp after the summer dispersal.[181]

Radlov has reported that the typical Kazakh _aul_ was composed of from fifty to seventy tents;[182] here it is

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[181] Meyendorff, 14.

●177.62
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[182] Radloff, Aus Sibirien, I, 518. By Radlov's day there had already taken place the administrative reform mentioned above, namely, the reorganization of villages into _volosti_ integrated into the Turkestan governor-generalcy. By then, too, the office of village elder had become appointive, and was no longer an expression of prestige through birth or wealth alone.

[Altai Kazakhs]

621 556 [101] 433 The nomads in question[1] occupied the steppe northeast of Zaisan Nur, around the uppermost course of the Cherny (Black) Irtysh, as semi-sedentary farmer-herders in the 1920's: the poorest Kazakhs dwelled in the winter camps the year round, and supported themselves by caring for their own farming plots and those of the wealthier Kazakhs and by hunting. The wealthier Kazakhs, in contrast, maintained a mixed economy, based mainly on herding, but with some farming, aided by the poorer Kazakhs. They were for the most part Naiman, with some Kereit elements among them.[268] [177.62] Hence the following account of aul nomadism is to be understood as an advanced state of acculturation, and connected only to the pastoralism of moderate and wealthy Kazakhs.[2]

621 The aul in its several variations was entirely a kin unit among these Kazakhs. The Kazakh aul elsewhere, even at an earlier period, no longer comprised a homogeneous kin group. This was not so among the northeasternmost Kazakhs. The auls of the latter fall into two categories: the fully nomadic auls, such as those of the Kazakhs in the Kosh-Agach aimak (Oirot Autonomous Oblast');[269] and auls which are entirely sedentary, such as those of the poor Kazakhs mentioned above, members

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[268] Ibid., 1-3, 62.

[269] Semoilovich, 312.

[1] [For further background on the Altai Kazakhs, cf. Cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, p. 523ff.--Analyst]

[2] [For further data, cf. Cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, pp. 527-544--Analyst]

621 was that it [1] preserved a number of features of a time We
1776 when acculturation was less advanced, giving ground in others: the growth of farming and the administrative reshuffling by the Russians were the main accculturative influences, but there were other minor ones, in technology for instance, which were not without an effect on the kinship picture. The increase in the gathering and storage of hay[283] influenced the nomadic cycle of the still-pastoral Kazakhs, encouraging some to continue to be herders, lessening the scope of movement of others, factors closely bound up with kinship. On the other hand, the scythes, etc., necessary for mowing, had to be purchased from the Russians, making for an increase in commodity exchange, closer economic interaction with the Russians, and an acceleration of the acculturative process once again.

Family and Marriage

596 The Kazakh family in the 1920's was an extended family and as such continued to form the innermost of a series of concentric circles of kinship; like the next outer concentric circle, the nomadic village, and like the outermost, the lineage, it was founded on an agnatically related membership, it was patrilocal, patriarchal,

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[283] Ibid., 24.

[1] [i.e., the nomadic village kin community of the northeastern Kazakhs (Altai Kazakhs) --Analyst]

[Great Horde]

conflict regarding the winter pasturages.

622 The bii[1] moreover had important functions in regulat-
582 ing marriage settlements, although he had little authority
692 over the family of the bride, if for example, it should
alter the amount of dowry it had arranged to settle on
the bride.[92] The reason for this is clear: the family
of the bride had a different set of consanguineal rela-
tionships, she belonged to another lineage, another vil-
lage (as a rule) under the judiciary guidance of another
bii. Thus we observe in a direct manner a further func-
tioning of the principle of patrilineal descent, in its
effect on the authority of the local elders and judges,
delimiting their power according to the extent of their
agnatic kin.

622 Even in the period starting with the end of the 19th
611 century, when strong acculturative influences were insti-
177 tuted, the principle of descent in the paternal line con-
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621 tinued to play a dominant role. The Kazakhs of the Great
692 Horde were now settled in Russian administrative districts
called volosti, which were in turn divided into still
smaller units. According to Izrastsov, the influence
of the bii[1] seldom extended beyond the smaller division
of the volost' in which he lived, and even more rarely
extended beyond the volost' itself. The force of his

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[92] Izrastsov, 82.

[1] [i.e. elder; cf. cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, p. 411 ff.
--Analyst]

[Great Horde]

622 judgments were likewise restricted; and the same agnatic
611 principle obtained: most of the inhabitants of a volost'
177 were kin, and the volost' was in general the means for
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632 recognizing and preserving the legal integrity of the
692 kin unit in this manner.[93] And even if the new kinship
groupings were not the same as those existing prior to the Russian culture contact, nevertheless the fiction in force made those in the same volost' kin to each other, and carried forward the principles upon which Kasakh society was based, even though in an altered external form.

622 Both under the new and the old (i.e., before and
611 after the Russian conquest) forms, a man stood with his
602 kinsmen regardless of where his own sympathies might lie,
692 and he supported the judgments of his bii[1] against all
outsiders, both the more distant kinsmen and strangers. Thus through the person of the local judge the principle of agnatic kinship determined the mode of adjudicating disputes between affinally related families, between or among various auls, or persons belonging to different families, auls, sub-lineages, etc. And the relationships thus called into dispute had been established in the first place through the operation of other rules within the principle of agnatic kinship. The affinally related families necessarily belonged to different patrilineages

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[93] Ibid., 4, 26.

[1] [i.e. elder; cf. Cat. 86, AH1 Mongolia, p. 411 ff.
--Analyst]

[Great Horde]

681 distributed among the elders of the clan or lineage, etc. 602 The remaining half was further divided, part being dis- 613 tributed among the more distant kin of the victim; how much was thus given out was up to the family of the victim, but it was impossible to give nothing. A slighted kinsman would appeal to the elders of the community, and was given a share of the kun proportional to the closeness of kinship. The remainder was divided among the sons of the victim, or if there were none, among the next of agnatic kin.[159]

177.68 681 621 The unit for payment[1] after the reorganization of Kazakh society under Russian impact was the aul; despite the composition of the village at this time by segments of various lineages, it continued to act through a convenient fiction as though it were a unitary kin group. Support for payment of the kun was drawn from neighbors within the aul and from the kinsmen, both of whom were treated sociologically as a unit. If the guilty refused to pay, then the lineage or the clan, now settled in a volost', simply raided the guilty man's herds and made seizure of the requisite amount.[160]

622 602 695 613 177.69 The biis[2] would often require that kin in the seventh degree of agnatic kinship take the oath in support of the accused. By this was meant, if the man were adjudged

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[159] Idem.

[160] Radloff, op. cit., I, 525.

[1] [i.e. of wergeld; cf. cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, p. 448 ff.--Analyst]

[2] [on the bii, cf. cat. 116, AH1 Mongolia, pp. 411-412--Analyst]

[Great Horde]

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[Great Horde]

622 guilty, the kin up to the seventh degree would be
602 required to support him in the payment of the indemnity.
695 613 Such a proceeding took place in 1885, some years after
177. 69 the Russian conquest, and represents a certain hardening
of the judicial practice; nevertheless, this hardening
was precisely of those features observable in Kazakh
177. society in the previous era. The power of the **bii**'s decree
69 695 now had the force of a court sentence, backed up
602 by an absolute coercive instrument: a police system,
a state mechanism, and so forth; but the person of the **bii**, and his kinship and social relations were more or less the same as before. The number of degrees of kinship recognized in a judgment were now fixed, but they were the same relationships which had been more vaguely defined in the preceding era.[161] Moreover, the entire proceeding was reported by an officer of the court to the Russian authorities; this signalizes the fact that the judges now had to bear in mind how the Russian provincial administration would respond to a judgment of a certain sort. Nevertheless, from all this we may see how vital the principle of kinship remained in the processes of adjudication, even under conditions of acculturation. We may observe how considerations of kinship operated in the legal process; and how legal data are significant in the interpretation of the consanguineal system.

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[161] Dingelstedt, 520.

[Middle Horde]

695 602 584 nence, the use of affinal ties. The bii would propose that a youth of one side marry a sister of the other; or alternatively, that one party marry off his son to a daughter of the other, provided that neither is already betrothed. The disputants would then embrace and call each other kuda, father-in-law of the respective children. In such a case, the children must be eligible to marry according to the rules of exogamy.[170] The close interrelation between the kinship system and the law is demonstrated in the interfunctioning of both consanguineal and affinal relationships in the adjudicative process.

177.69 695 428 The legal process continued to function within the kinship system even under conditions of acculturation, as evidenced in the following case among the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde in the 1870's. A man had two older brothers who had been allotted their shares of the father's estate during the lifetime of the father, while the youngest remained by his father's side until the death of the latter. Through the principle of ultimogeniture, the residual property should have gone to the youngest son, but the two older brothers threatened to take the herds and pasturage away from him. The youngest brother then appealed to his legal authorities, the biis of his community. (Note: the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde had been

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[170] Ibragimov, 237.

[Middle Horde]

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longer under Russian rule than those of the Great Horde. The acculturative process had proceeded farther in the Middle Horde than in the Great Horde as of the 1870's, as will be seen from the issues raised in the pleadings.) The older brothers argued that the Kazakh customs were no longer in force, and that Russian law required an equitable distribution of the paternal estate regardless of the settlements made on the older sons by the father during his lifetime. The matter thus presented to the _biis_ brought from them the decision that the youngest son, the residuary legatee, had to give up one of his winter camps to the other two. (Evidently a wealthy estate was in question here.) The youngest son appealed to the Russian courts, who advised him simply to comply with the decision of the _biis_, but to take one of the older brothers' winter camps instead. The youngest son declined both decisions.

His appeal to the Russian courts was strongly resented by the community and he was threatened with arrest, whereupon he removed to a nearby town, and the entire affair was placed in the hands of the local _biis_, but it was left unsettled. Finally the courts found in favor of the youngest son after the appointment of a new governor general in the region.[171]

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[171] Ibid., 253-257.

[Middle Horde]

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A number of salient features of Kazakh family life in the Middle Horde are brought to light in this case: the practice of allotment to all sons but the youngest during the lifetime of the father; the idea that they thus gave up all further rights in the estate of the father; the principle of ultimogeniture; the role of the bii in settling disputes; the break-up of family unity through a quarrel between or among brothers. The measure of the degree of acculturation is likewise made precise in this matter. We note a number of new features: the appeal to Russian practices in inheritance; appeal to the Russian courts to decide the matter; the resentment by the Kazakh community of the Russian appeal; the final decisive role of the Russian administration--which, it is important to note, found for the plaintiff in accordance with the Russian court's conception of what the Kazakh custom was, and rejecting the elder brothers' notion of what the Russian custom in inheritance was. The flight to the town to escape the resentment of the community made by the youngest brother indicates nothing about acculturation: it could have been a new feature brought in by Russian contact, it could have been an old feature, because towns have existed in the vicinity of the steppe for many millenia.

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The Middle Horde differed from the Great Horde in two respects: it exhibits no trace of any dual organization, a feature of the large-scale social structure of